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Abstract
We consider a model of ﬁrm pricing and consumer choice, where consumers are loss
averse and uncertain about their future demand. Possibly, consumers in our model
prefer a ﬂat rate to a measured tariﬀ, even though this choice does not minimize their
expected billing amount—a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence. We solve
for the proﬁt-maximizing two-part tariﬀ, which is a ﬂat rate if (a) marginal costs are
not too high, (b) loss aversion is intense, and (c) there are strong variations in de-
mand. Moreover, we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariﬀ. This tariﬀ has a large ﬂat
part when a ﬂat rate is optimal among the class of two-part tariﬀs.
JEL classiﬁcation: D11; D43; L11
Keywords: Consumer Loss Aversion; Flat-Rate Tariﬀs; Nonlinear Pricing; Uncertain De-
mand
1. Introduction
Flat-rate tariﬀs that oﬀer unlimited usage for a ﬁxed amount of money are common prac-
tice in many industries, e.g., for telephone services, Internet access, car rental, car leasing,
DVD rental, amusement parks, and many others. The prevalence of ﬂat rates is hard
to reconcile with orthodox economic theory. In industries where marginal costs are non-
negligible, a marginal payment of zero leads to an ineﬃciently high level of consumption.
A ﬂat rate can nevertheless be optimal if measuring the actual usage of a consumer is
costly (Sundararajan, 2004). Flat-rate contracts, however, are also found in industries
with positive marginal costs where measurement costs are almost zero, e.g. for rental cars
or telephone services.1 For rental cars, a typical contract has a ﬁxed price per day that
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1does not depend on the mileage.2 The costs for the car rental company are clearly higher
if the car is used more heavily, for instance due to a higher wear of the tires. On the other
hand, it is not very costly to determine the mileage of a customer.3,4 Given these obser-
vations, what reasons do ﬁrms have to oﬀer ﬂat-rate contracts? We provide a theoretical
answer which lies outside standard consumer behavior.5
There is plenty of evidence that consumers often do not select the tariﬀ option that
minimizes their expenditure for observed consumption patterns. In particular, consumers
often prefer a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ even though they would save money with a measured tariﬀ.
Train (1991) referred to this phenomenon as the “ﬂat-rate bias.”6 Given that consumers
are willing to pay a “ﬂat-rate premium”, it is unsurprising that ﬂat rates are widely used.
The literature classiﬁes three potential causes of the ﬂat-rate bias: the taxi-meter
eﬀect, overestimation, and an insurance motive (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006). The ﬁrst
eﬀect is discussed in the literature on mental accounting. If a measured tariﬀ makes the
link between payment and consumption very salient, it reduces the consumer’s pleasure
from the service. Put diﬀerently, during a taxi ride consumers dislike observing the meter
running. According to mental accounting theory, the taxi-meter eﬀect can be avoided if
payments are decoupled from consumption (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; Thaler, 1999).
In the industries we consider, however, consumers do not directly pay for consumption,
but receive a bill at the end of the billing period. It is therefore unclear whether payments
and consumption are suﬃciently tightly coupled to create a strong taxi-meter eﬀect.
Second, consumers may overestimate their future consumption and thus overvalue a
contract with unlimited usage. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) provide evidence that
many customers of health clubs overpredict their future usage. As the authors carefully
expose, this misprediction could be caused by na¨ ıve quasi-hyperbolic discounting. DellaV-
igna and Malmendier (2004) show that with na¨ ıve quasi-hyperbolic discounters, the unit
price of the optimal two-part tariﬀ is below marginal costs for investment goods (health
club attendance). For leisure goods like rental cars, however, na¨ ıve quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counters underestimate future demand and the optimal unit price exceeds marginal costs.
Third, consumers may prefer ﬂat rates because they would like to be insured against
payment variations that arise with measured tariﬀs if future consumption is uncertain.
2For instance, in Germany, the car rental companies Avis, Europcar, and Hertz (three major enterprises)
oﬀer ﬂat-rate contracts. Another common contractual form for rental cars is a three-part tariﬀ: the contract
includes a mileage allowance and a charge per mile thereafter.
3Typically, car rental companies record the car’s mileage in the ﬁnal bill even for contracts with unlimited
mileage. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
4Other well-ﬁtting examples are the ﬂat-rate contracts for leasing cars newly introduced by Ford and
Citro¨ en in Germany. These contracts cover—next to the usual services—also wear repairings for a ﬁxed
amount per month that does not depend on the mileage.
5We do not claim that our explanation is unique. For instance, with standard consumer behavior
marginal prices below marginal costs can be explained by crossing demand curves (Ng and Weissner,
1974).
6The ﬂat-rate bias was ﬁrst documented for US household demand for telephone services (Train et al.,
1987; Hobson and Spady, 1988; Kling and van der Ploeg, 1990; Mitchell and Vogelsang, 1991). Nunes
(2000) provides evidence outside the telecommunications industry. For an overview see Lambrecht and
Skiera (2006). Miravete (2003) ﬁnds no evidence for a ﬂat-rate bias for telephone services.
2Early articles investigating the ﬂat-rate bias, like Train et al. (1989), point out that “cus-
tomers do not choose tariﬀs with complete knowledge of their demand, but rather choose
tariﬀs [...] on the basis of the insurance provided by the tariﬀ in the face of uncertain
consumption patterns (p. 63).”7 Standard risk aversion is not suﬃcient to explain the
insurance motive, since the variations in payments are usually small compared to a con-
sumer’s income (Clay et al., 1992; Miravete, 2002). If one presumes that consumers are
“narrow bracketers,” risk aversion can explain why consumers have a preference for ﬂat-
rate tariﬀs but it does not explain why ﬁrms oﬀer such tariﬀs. If demand is price sensitive,
a slightly positive unit price creates an incentive for the consumers to partly internalize the
ﬁrm’s cost. This increases eﬃciency without imposing an unpleasant risk on the consumer.
In order to model the insurance motive, we posit that consumers are loss averse.8 A
loss-averse consumer is ﬁrst-order risk averse, i.e., he dislikes even small deviations from
his reference point. We consider a model where a monopolistic ﬁrm oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ
to consumers. When deciding whether to accept the contract, a consumer is uncertain
about his future demand. After accepting the contract, the consumer learns his demand
type, chooses a quantity and makes a payment according to the two-part tariﬀ. We assume
that a consumer’s demand is always satiated for a ﬁnite quantity. For example, consider a
consumer who decides today whether or not to sign a contract with a rental car company
for his holidays in a few weeks. How many miles he will drive depends on the weather. If
the sun is always shining, the consumer uses the car only to drive to the nearby beach.
But if the weather is bad, he takes longer sight-seeing trips.
At the consumption stage, the consumer compares his actual bill to his reference bill.
The consumer is disappointed if the actual bill exceeds the reference bill and tries to
avoid this loss by reducing his consumption. The reference bill is determined by the
consumer’s lagged rational expectations about his billing amounts, which he forms before
accepting the contract.9 Following K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that the
reference point is the full distribution of possible billing amounts, and that the consumer’s
expectations are a self-fulﬁlling, i.e., the demand function is a personal equilibrium. At
the contracting stage, the consumer anticipates the losses he will feel with a measured
tariﬀ. This increases his willingness to pay for contracts that insure against variations in
payments. Put diﬀerently, the consumer’s preferences are biased in favor of ﬂat rates.
We abstract from loss aversion in the “good dimension,” i.e., the consumer does not
experience a loss if his expected gross utility from consumption is higher than his actual
utility from consumption. Intuitively, a consumer does not feel a loss if the weather is nice
7Evidence that the ﬂat-rate bias is—at least partially—driven by the insurance eﬀect is provided by
Kridel et al. (1993), Lambrecht and Skiera (2006), and Lambrecht et al. (2007).
8The marketing literature mentions consumer loss aversion as a potential explanation for the ﬂat-rate
bias (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006). Loss aversion requires the implicit assumption of narrow bracketing.
For an overview of the empirical evidence on loss aversion see Camerer (2004) and the references therein.
9Abeler et al. (forthcoming), Post et al. (2008), Crawford and Meng (forthcoming), Gill and Prowse
(forthcoming), and Ericson and Fuster (2010) provide evidence that reference points are determined by
expectations. See Berseghyan et al. (2010) for a paper that does not ﬁnd evidence for expectation-based
loss aversion.
3and he uses the rental car less often than expected. The consumer feels a loss, however, if
the rental price depends on his mileage and he used the car more often than expected.10
This assumption also guarantees monotonicity of the demand function with respect to the
demand type, which simpliﬁes the characterization of personal equilibria.
We consider a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist who oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ to the con-
sumers. There is symmetric information at the contracting stage. neither the consumers
nor the monopolist know the realized demand types. The monopolist can extract all ex-
pected surplus arising from the contract via the lump-sum fee. Therefore, his objective
when setting the unit price is to maximize total expected surplus including the expected
losses felt by the consumers. The monopolist faces a trade-oﬀ between maximizing stan-
dard eﬃciency which would require a positive unit price, and minimizing expected losses,
which can be achieved by setting a unit price of zero. Minimizing losses is more impor-
tant than maximizing standard eﬃciency and thus a ﬂat-rate contact is optimal, if (i)
the marginal cost is small, (ii) the consumer is suﬃciently loss averse, and (iii) demand
is suﬃciently uncertain. Intuitively, if marginal costs are low, the quantities demanded
under a ﬂat rate are close to the eﬃcient levels, so that overconsumption is not very costly.
Moreover, the insurance value of a ﬂat rate is high if either the variation in demand or
the degree of loss aversion is high. Flat rates arise only when the consumer is suﬃciently
uncertain about his future consumption. Demand uncertainty is necessary for the insur-
ance eﬀect, but is not needed for the competing explanations of the ﬂat-rate bias, the
taxi-meter eﬀect and overestimation of demand.11
We extend our analysis and solve for the optimal nonlinear tariﬀ, which relaxes the
restriction to two-part tariﬀs. When the marginal cost is low, the optimal tariﬀ consists
of a ﬂat part for intermediate quantities. The size of the ﬂat part increases if (i) the
consumer’s degree of loss aversion increases, (ii) variations in preferences and thus in
demanded quantities increase, and (iii) the marginal cost decreases. The optimal general
tariﬀ is increasing at least for some quantities at the extremes of the quantity schedule.
Moreover, focusing on two-part tariﬀs, we inspect the robustness of our ﬁndings. First,
we consider heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their degree of loss aversion.
We derive conditions such that the monopolist can screen diﬀerently loss-averse consumers
without costs. In this case, it can optimal to oﬀer a menu of tariﬀs that includes a ﬂat
rate and a measured tariﬀ. Second, we show that the structure of the optimal two-part
tariﬀ does not depend on the degree of competition. Finally, we relax the assumption that
consumers do not feel losses if their consumption utility is lower than expected. With
10One could defend this assumption also on the ground that there is one point in time where the
consumer receives his bill and compares it with his expectations, whereas the potential losses regarding
the consumption of the good are distributed among the whole billing period and therefore are less salient.
11Uncertainty may also play a role in the mental accounting explanation. Prelec and Loewenstein
(1998) argue that “mental prepayment” allows a consumer to enjoy consumption without thinking about
the associated payments. If consumption is uncertain, ﬂat rates facilitate mental prepayment whereas
measured tariﬀs do not allow the consumer to mentally pay in advance because the exact billing amount
is unknown beforehand. This could create a ﬂat-rate bias if demand is uncertain.
4this generalization consumers form rational expectations that serve as a reference point
not only about the payment but also about the utility from consumption. Under certain
assumptions, a ﬂat-rate contract is optimal under the same conditions as in the baseline
model.
In our model with rational consumers, the monopolist oﬀers a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ because
consumers are willing to pay a premium in order to be insured against unexpected high
bills. The ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is not oﬀered to exploit a cognitive bias of the consumers. This is
in contrast to several models with boundedly rational consumers where ﬁrms design tariﬀs
to exploit consumers’ biases, see for instance Grubb (2009) or Eliaz and Spiegler (2008).
Related Literature This paper is related to a recent and growing literature investigat-
ing how rational ﬁrms respond to consumer biases. In a seminal contribution, DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2004) consider a market with time-inconsistent consumers and solve for
the two-part tariﬀ oﬀered in equilibrium. A perfectly competitive market for credit cards
with quasi-hyperbolic discounters is analyzed by Heidhues and K˝ oszegi (2010b). Using a
diﬀerent notion of time-inconsistency, Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) solve for the optimal menu
of tariﬀs for a monopolist who faces consumers that diﬀer in their degree of sophistication.
Esteban et al. (2007) also analyze the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme for a monopolist
who sells to consumers with self-control problems. Instead of assuming time-inconsistency,
they model self-control problems using the concept of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).12
Another strand of the literature analyzes optimal selling strategies for overconﬁdent
consumers. The optimal menu of nonlinear tariﬀs for consumers who underestimate ﬂuc-
tuations in their future demand is analyzed by Grubb (2009). The optimal menu is similar
to a menu of three-part tariﬀs which is common for cellular phone services.13 Focusing on
only two states of the world, Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) solve the tariﬀ design problem of a
monopolist who faces consumers with biased beliefs.
Closer to our paper, Hahn et al. (2010) adopt the model of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006,
2007) and analyze the optimal product line of a monopolist who faces loss-averse con-
sumers. After observing the oﬀered product line, but before knowing their own types,
consumers form expectations about the products they will purchase. The main ﬁnding is
that the optimal product line contains fewer products than predicted by standard version-
ing models.
Expectation-based loss aversion according to K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) is also
applied in other contexts. Heidhues and K˝ oszegi (2010a) apply this concept to provide
an explanation why regular prices are sticky but sales prices are variable. Heidhues and
K˝ oszegi (2008) introduce consumer loss aversion into a model of horizontally diﬀerentiated
ﬁrms. They show that in equilibrium, asymmetric competitors charge identical focal prices
12Similar results are obtained by Esteban and Miyagawa (2006) for a perfectly competitive market.
13Uthemann (2005) studies a similar model where ﬁrms screen consumers with respect to their priors.
5for diﬀerentiated products.14 Considering an agency model, Herweg et al. (2010) provide
an explanation for the frequent usage of lump-sum bonus contracts. A repeated moral
hazard model with a loss-averse agent is analyzed by Macera (2009).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a simple example that illustrates the
main ﬁndings. The baseline model with two-part tariﬀs is introduced in Section 3. The
demand function of a loss-averse consumer who accepted a two-part tariﬀ is investigated
in Section 4. Section 5 derives conditions for a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to be optimal within the
class of two-part tariﬀs. General nonlinear pricing schemes are analyzed in Section 6 while
Section 7 discusses further extensions of the baseline model. Section 8 concludes. All
proofs of the main analysis in Sections 3 to 5 are contained in the appendix. The formal
derivation of the extensions in Sections 6 and 7 are developed in the web appendix.
2. Illustrative Example
Consider a monopolist who sells one good to a single consumer. The monopolist produces
with constant marginal cost 0 < c < 6. The take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of the monopolist is
a two-part tariﬀ T(q) = L + pq, where q ≥ 0 is the quantity, p is the unit price, and L is
the basic charge. The consumer’s (intrinsic) consumption utility is quasi linear and given
by: u = θq − (1/2)q2 − T. The consumer’s demand—his satiation point—depends on his
demand type θ = 6,10. With probability α ∈ (0,1) the type is “low demand” (θ = 6),
and with probability 1 − α the type is “high demand” (θ = 10). The average type is
¯ θ = 6+(1−α)4 and the variance is σ2 = 16α(1−α). At the contracting stage, neither the
ﬁrm nor the consumer knows the demand type. After deciding whether or not to accept
the monopolist’s oﬀer, the consumer privately observes his demand type and makes his
purchasing decision. Moreover, we posit that the consumer is loss averse, in the sense that
he incurs a loss when paying more than his reference bill r. His total utility is u−µ, with
µ = λmax{T − r,0} and λ ∈ [0,1].15 For λ = 0 the consumer has standard preferences,
whereas for λ > 0 he is loss averse.
A key question in the literature on reference-dependent preferences is what determines
the reference point. First, we assume that the reference point equals the basic charge,
i.e. r = L, if the consumer accepts the contract, and zero otherwise. This reference point
could be viewed as a forward looking status quo, since the consumer needs to pay the basic
charge in any case. For a given demand type, the consumer chooses q in order to maximize
θq−(1/2)q2−pq−L−λpq. Hence, the optimal quantity is given by q(θ) = θ−p(λ+1). Due
to ex ante contracting, the basic charge L is chosen such that the consumer’s expected
utility equals zero, i.e., the monopolist extracts the entire expected surplus. Thus, the
14Karle and Peitz (2010a,b) also study consumer loss aversion in a model of product diﬀerentiation.
15We restrict λ to be less than 1 in order to guarantee concavity of the monopolist’s objective function.
6optimal unit price p∗ maximizes the joint surplus S(p)—expected utility plus proﬁts,
S(p) = α(1/2)(6 − p(λ + 1))2 + (1 − α)(1/2)(10 − p(λ + 1))2
+ (p − c)[α(6 − p(λ + 1)) + (1 − α)(10 − p(λ + 1))].
For a consumer with “standard” preferences (λ = 0), the monopolist optimally sets the
marginal price equal to the marginal cost, i.e. p∗ = c, so that the consumer fully internalizes
production costs. On the other hand, if the consumer is loss averse, it might be optimal to






This example illustrates the basic insight that a preference for ﬂat-rate tariﬀs can be
explained by loss aversion. Moreover, a ﬂat rate is more likely to be optimal when marginal
costs are small or the degree of loss aversion is high.
The empirical literature documenting the ﬂat-rate bias points out that this bias is
driven by consumers’ uncertainty about future consumption. In the above example,
whether or not a ﬂat rate is optimal is independent of the variation in the consumer’s
demand. In order to capture the eﬀect of uncertainty, we apply a somewhat more complex
model of loss aversion. Following K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006), we posit that at the con-
tracting stage, the consumer forms rational expectations about his future demand, which
determine his reference point. The reference point is the full distribution of potential
billing amounts. A given billing amount is compared to the billing amount the consumer
expected to pay in the low-demand state and to the expected billing amount in the high-
demand state. While the former comparison is weighted by α, the latter is weighted by
1−α. The consumer’s reference point (distribution) is determined at the contracting stage
and is ﬁxed at the point in time when he chooses his actual consumption. For a given
reference point  q(6),q(10) , the consumer chooses his consumption level q to maximize
θq − (1/2)q2 − pq − L − λ
 
αmax{p(q − q(6)),0} + (1 − α)max{p(q − q(10)),0}
 
Since expected consumption inﬂuences actual consumption, K˝ oszegi and Rabin impose
a consistency criterion called personal equilibrium. The expected consumption levels that
form the consumer’s reference point must coincide with the optimal consumption levels for
the respective types. We now show that the type-dependent demand function q(6) = 6−p
and q(10) = 10 − p(1 + αλ) constitutes a personal equilibrium, as long as p is not too
large and thus q(6) ≤ (10). Suppose that the consumer’s reference point is  q(6),q(10) .
If type θ = 6 is realized and the consumer chooses a quantity q ≤ q(6), then he neither
feels a loss compared to the bill for q(6) nor to the bill for q(10) and thus the optimal
quantity is q(6). If the consumer chooses a quantity q(6) < q ≤ q(10), then he feels a loss
of p(q − q(6)) which is weighted by α. Due to this loss, the consumer prefers to choose a
7quantity lower than q(6) and we are back in the former case. Now, suppose that θ = 10
and that the consumer chooses a quantity q(6) < q ≤ q(10). Then his utility is given by
10q − (1/2)q2 − pq − L
      
intrinsic utility
−αλp[q − q(6)]
      
loss utility
.
With probability α, the consumer expected to pay only L + pq(6) but his actual bill is
L + pq. Comparing the actual and the expected bill leads to the sensation of a loss of
p(q − q(6)). With probability 1 − α, the consumer expected to pay L + pq(10), but since
his actual bill is lower, this comparison does not lead to the sensation of a loss. The above
utility is maximized by demanding q = q(10) = 10 − p(1 + αλ). If the consumer chooses
a quantity q > q(10), additional losses arise from the comparison with the payment in the
high demand state:
10q − (1/2)q2 − pq − L
      
intrinsic utility
−αλp[q − q(6)] − λ(1 − α)p[q − q(10)]
      
loss utility
.
Therefore, the consumer prefers to choose a q = q(10). Thus, we have shown that q(6)
and q(10) indeed constitute a personal equilibrium.
Again, the monopolist chooses the marginal price p in order to maximize the joint
surplus including expected loss utility. The joint surplus is given by
S(p) = α(1/2)(6 − p)2 + (1 − α)(1/2)(10 − p(1 + αλ))(10 − p(1 − αλ))
      
expected intrinsic utility
− λα(1 − α)p[4 − pαλ]
      
expected loss
+(p − c)[α(6 − p) + (1 − α)(10 − p(1 + αλ))]
      
expected proﬁts from sales
.
For a measured tariﬀ, i.e. p > 0, the consumer expects to incur a loss which reduces his
expected utility and in turn the joint surplus. The term λα(1−α)p[4−pαλ] captures the
“ﬂat-rate premium,”that the consumer is willing to pay for the insurance provided by the
ﬂat rate. The ﬂat-rate premium vanishes if the unit price goes to zero or if there is no
uncertainty in demand, i.e. α → 0 or α → 1. Intuitively, a loss-averse consumer dislikes
ﬂuctuations in his billing amount which reduces his willingness to pay for the measured
tariﬀ. A ﬂat-rate tariﬀ completely insures the consumer against variations in the billing
amount.
For λ = 0—no loss aversion—marginal cost pricing is optimal, i.e. p∗ = c. A ﬂat-rate




Hence, a ﬂat rate is optimal when three criteria are satisﬁed: (i) the consumer is loss
averse, i.e. λ > 0 , (ii) the marginal cost is not too high, and (iii) the consumption pattern
is suﬃciently uncertain, i.e., σ2 not too small. The model predicts, for instance, that
8one observes ﬂat-rate contracts for rental cars, in particular at vacation resorts where
customers are unfamiliar with the network of roads. The model does not predict ﬂat rates
for heating oil. Typically, the demand for heating oil is uncertain but the marginal costs
are high.
A further interesting insight can be obtained by considering the case where the mo-
nopolist sells to two ex ante heterogeneous consumers. Suppose that both consumers have
identically distributed demand types. One has standard preferences while the other one
is loss averse. The degree of loss aversion is private information of the consumers. Sup-
pose further, that under complete information it is optimal to oﬀer a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to the
loss-averse consumer. What is the optimal menu of two-part tariﬀs if the consumers are
privately informed about their degree of loss aversion? The monopolist optimally oﬀers a
cost-based tariﬀ and a ﬂat rate as if she could the observe consumers’ types. The basic
charge of the cost-based tariﬀ is chosen such that the consumer with standard preferences
has an expected utility of zero. Therefore, the loss-averse consumer strictly prefers the ﬂat
rate. Intuitively, loss aversion reduces the expected utility a consumer obtains from ac-
cepting a measured tariﬀ, so that the loss-averse consumer has a negative expected utility
from this contract. On the other hand, the consumer with standard preferences weakly
prefers the measured tariﬀ. His expected utility equals zero under both contracts because
the expected utility from signing a ﬂat-rate contract is independent of a consumer’s degree
of loss aversion.16 Thus, the monopolist can screen diﬀerently loss-averse consumers at no
cost and it is optimal to oﬀer a cost-based tariﬀ next to a ﬂat rate.
3. Monopolistic Market with Homogeneous Consumers
3.1. Players and Timing
We consider a market where a monopolist produces a single good at constant marginal
cost c > 0 and without ﬁxed costs. The monopolist oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ to a continuum
of ex ante homogeneous consumers of measure one. The tariﬀ is given by T(q) = L + pq,
where q ≥ 0 is the quantity, L denotes the basic charge, and p denotes the unit price.
At the contracting stage, a consumer does not know his future demand type θ ∈ Θ :=
[θ, ¯ θ]. Consumers’ demand types are independently and identically distributed according
to the commonly known and twice diﬀerentiable cumulative distribution function F(θ)
with strictly positive density function f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ].
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer (L,p) to consumers. (2) Each consumer forms expectations about his demand and
decides whether or not to accept the oﬀered two-part tariﬀ. (3) Each consumer privately
observes his demand type θ. (4) Each consumer who accepted the oﬀer chooses a quantity
16In a perfectly competitive market not only the loss-averse consumer strictly prefers the ﬂat rate, but
also the standard consumer strictly prefers the cost-based tariﬀ. In a perfectly competitive market the
basic charge is determined by a zero proﬁt condition.
9that maximizes his utility and makes a payment according to the concluded contract.
3.2. Consumers’ Preferences
We assume that consumers are loss averse in the sense that a consumer is disappointed
if the payment he has to make exceeds his reference payment. Intuitively, consumers feel
a loss if at the end of the month the invoice from their telephone provider is higher than
expected. For the situations we have in mind, it seems natural that the reference point
incorporates lagged expectations. Therefore, we apply the approach of reference-dependent
preferences developed by K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). First, this concept posits that
overall utility has two additively separable components, consumption utility (intrinsic
utility) and gain-loss utility. Second, the consumer’s reference point is determined by
his lagged rational expectations about outcomes. Third, a given outcome is evaluated
by comparing it to each possible outcome, where each comparison is weighted with the
ex-ante probability of the alternative outcome. Finally, actual choices must coincide with
expected choices.
Intrinsic utility is quasi linear in money and given by u(q,θ) − T(q). For the markets
we have in mind, like rental cars or telecommunication services, even if the price per unit is
zero, demand is bounded. Therefore, we assume that there exists a satiation point, qS(θ),
and that overconsumption is harmless, i.e., free disposal is possible. Additionally, we
assume that a higher demand type is associated with a stronger need for the good. These
assumptions imply that a higher demand type corresponds to a strictly higher satiation
point. Heterogeneity of the satiation points is a necessary condition for the optimality of
ﬂat rates, or more generally ﬂat parts in a general tariﬀ, as we will elaborate later.
Formally, a consumer’s utility without free disposal is given by the function ˆ u(q,θ). For
each demand type θ ∈ Θ, ˆ u(.,θ) has a unique maximum at the satiation point qS(θ) > 0.





ˆ u(q,θ), if q ≤ qS(θ),
ˆ u(qS(θ),θ) if q > qS(θ).
Assumption 1. (i) ˆ u(q,θ) satisﬁes ∂qˆ u(q,θ) > 0 for q < qS(θ), and ∂qqˆ u(q,θ) < −ρ,
and ∂qθˆ u(q,θ) > κ, for all θ ∈ Θ and all q ≥ 0, where ρ,κ > 0.
(ii) ˆ u(q,θ) is three times continuously diﬀerentiable with bounded ﬁrst, second and third
derivatives.
(iii) We normalize utility such that Eθ[u(0,θ)] = 0 and assume that ∂qu(0,θ) is suﬃciently
big to ensure positive demand whenever necessary.
For example, the quadratic utility function ˆ u(q,θ) = θq − (1/2)q2 which we used in
Section 2 satisﬁes Assumption 1.17
17To ensure positive demand for all types (Assumption 1.iii), we need to assume that θ is not too small.
10By Assumption 1, the satiation point qS(θ) is given by ∂qˆ u(qS(θ),θ) = 0. The prop-
erty that the cross derivative is positive—even when evaluated at the satiation point—







In order to rule out arbitrarily high demand under a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, we assume that a
consumer who is indiﬀerent between two or more quantities, always chooses the lowest of
these quantities. Alternatively, one could assume that overconsumption is not harmless.
For simplicity, we depart from the concept of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) by
assuming that the consumer feels losses only in the money dimension.18 Relaxing this
assumption does not change our main ﬁndings as is demonstrated below. The loss function
is assumed to be piece-wise linear, since the main driver of loss aversion—in particular
for small stakes—is the kink in the value function and not its diminishing sensitivity. If a
consumer pays T, but expected to pay ˆ T, then his loss utility is given by
µ(T − ˆ T) = max{λ(T − ˆ T),0},
with λ ≥ 0. For λ > 0 the consumer’s preferences exhibit loss aversion, whereas λ = 0
corresponds to the standard case without loss aversion.19
Consider a consumer who signed a given contract. His expected demand schedule fully
determines the distribution of his expected payments, and thus his reference point. If his
demand type is φ and his expected consumption is  q(θ) θ∈Θ, his overall utility from this
contract when purchasing q units, is given by
U(q|φ, q(θ) ) = u(q,φ) − T(q) −
  ¯ θ
θ
µ(T(q) − T(q(θ))) f(θ) dθ . (2)
Observe that for p ≥ 0, a higher quantity increases the number of demand types compared
to which the consumer feels a loss.
To deal with the resulting interdependence between actual consumption and expected
consumption, we apply the personal equilibrium concept, which requires that the reference
point is given by rational (self-fulﬁlling) expectations about the consumption decision
(K˝ oszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007).
18This assumption is also imposed by Spiegler (2010). The implications of not assuming a universal
gain-loss function for both dimensions are investigated by Karle and Peitz (2010b).
19Our ﬁndings are qualitatively robust toward applying the usual two-piece linear gain-loss function with
a slope of ˜ η > 0 for gains and a slope of ˜ λ˜ η > ˜ η for losses. The optimality of ﬂat-rate contracts is driven
by the consumer’s ex ante preferences and ex ante only net losses matter. We refrain from applying this
gain-loss function because it introduces a time inconsistency problem caused by assuming loss aversion only
in the money dimension. Without loss aversion (˜ λ = 1) the marginal utility of money equals 1+ ˜ η ex post,
but ex ante, gains and losses cancel in expectation so that the marginal utility of money is 1 < 1 + ˜ η. λ
in our model captures the overall impact of loss aversion and reference dependence, and therefore roughly
corresponds to ˜ η(˜ λ−1) in the usual formulation. For a more detailed comparison we refer to Section D of
the web appendix.
11Deﬁnition 1 (Personal Equilibrium). For a given unit price p, the demand function
 ˆ q(θ,p) θ∈Θ is a personal equilibrium if for all φ ∈ Θ,
ˆ q(φ,p) ∈ argmax
q≥0
U(q|φ, ˆ q(θ,p) ) .
4. The Demand Function
4.1. Personal Equilibria
In this section, we analyze the personal equilibrium demand function of a consumer who
accepted a two-part tariﬀ (p,L). We can restrict attention to nonnegative unit prices,
p ≥ 0. A negative unit price cannot be optimal since overconsumption is harmless. We
now show that for low unit prices, there is a unique personal equilibrium. In this personal
equilibrium, higher types demand strictly higher quantities. For higher unit prices, there
are multiple personal equilibria, all of which involve bunches in the demand schedule. Since
we are interested in ﬂat rates, we will not analyze these “bunching” personal equilibria.
In Assumption 1, we assumed that higher demand types have a stronger (intrinsic)
preference for the good (∂qθu > 0). Adding loss utility only in the money dimension
does not destroy this property. The consumer’s loss utility only depends on how much
he consumes and is thus independent of his demand type. For any given reference point
 q(θ) , higher demand types still have a stronger preference for the good. Hence, any
personal equilibrium demand schedule must be weakly increasing in the demand type.20
In a personal equilibrium  ˆ q(θ,p) , a consumer who consumes q feels losses compared
to all types who consume less than q. If ˆ q(θ,p) is strictly increasing in θ, he therefore feels
losses compared to all types below a cutoﬀ type α(q). α(q) is given by ˆ q(α(q),p) = q.21
With this notation, the utility of a consumer with demand type θ who consumes q, can
be expressed as
U(q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) ) = u(q,θ) − pq − L − λp
  α(q)
θ
[q − ˆ q(φ,p)]f(φ) dφ . (3)
The utility function (3) is strictly concave and thus the optimal quantity is characterized
by the ﬁrst-order condition. Taking the ﬁrst-order condition and using that in equilibrium
a consumer with demand type θ feels losses compared to all types below θ, i.e. α(q) = θ,
we obtain the following condition which characterizes the demand function of a strictly
increasing personal equilibrium:
∂qu(˜ q(θ,p),θ) = p[1 + λF(θ)]. (4)
20The assumption that losses are felt only in the money dimension is crucial. If the consumer also feels
losses in the good dimension, personal equilibrium demand need not be weakly monotone.
21Lemma 3 in the appendix shows that q must be continuous in the demand type. The proof is straight-
forward because two-part tariﬀs are continuous. The absence of continuity of demand in the case of general
tariﬀs is a major complication of the generalized model analyzed in Section 6.
12The solution to this equation is a candidate for a personal equilibrium and shall be denoted
as ˜ q(θ,p). For a standard consumer without loss aversion (λ = 0), ˜ q(θ,p) equates marginal
utility and unit price. For p = 0, each type demands his satiation point independently of
his degree of loss aversion, i.e., ˜ q(θ,0) = qS(θ). For p > 0, a loss-averse consumer perceives
a loss compared to lower demand types which are paying lower bills. Thus, loss aversion
leads to a downward distortion of demand for all but the lowest demand type and this
distortion is increasing in the type. Finally, ˜ q(θ,p) has the reasonable property that it is
decreasing in the unit price.
The candidate ˜ q( ) constitutes a personal equilibrium only if it is strictly increasing in
the demand type, which is equivalent to the following condition:





In the appendix, we show that every personal equilibrium must be strictly increasing
if ˜ q( ) is strictly increasing in the demand type. This enables us to show our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1. Suppose Condition 1 holds. Then there exists a unique personal equilib-
rium, which is given by  ˜ q(θ,p) θ∈Θ.
Proposition 1 shows existence and uniqueness of the strictly increasing personal equi-
librium ˜ q( ), if the unit price is not too high. The range of unit prices for which Condition
1 holds depends (i) on the degree of loss aversion and (ii) on the heterogeneity of prefer-
ences. If preferences vary with the demand type, maximizing intrinsic utility requires an
increasing demand schedule. Minimizing losses, on the other hand, requires a ﬂat demand
schedule, in particular if the unit price is high. Therefore, Condition 1 is more likely to be
satisﬁed if loss aversion is not very strong (λ is small), and there is suﬃcient heterogeneity
of preferences measured by ∂qθu(q,θ)/f(θ).22
Deﬁne ¯ p := minθ{κ/[λf(θ)]}, where κ > 0 is the lower bound of ∂qθu(q,θ) (cf. As-
sumption 1). A suﬃcient condition for (C1) is p < ¯ p. With the quadratic utility function
ˆ u(q,θ) = θq −(1/2)q2 and uniformly distributed types θ ∼ U[θ,θ +1] we have ¯ p = 1/λ. If
loss utility is less important than intrinsic utility (λ < 1), then ¯ p > 1 in this example.
Condition 1 is independent of the marginal cost. A ﬂat rate, however, can only be
optimal if marginal costs are not too high. As we will show later, if marginal costs are
suﬃciently low, then the gains from trade for prices above ¯ p are lower than the gains
from trade generated by a ﬂat rate. Hence, for low marginal costs it is never optimal for
the monopolist to set unit prices for which bunching occurs. Since we are interested in
situations where it is optimal for ﬁrms to oﬀer ﬂat-rate tariﬀs, we will restrict attention
to unit prices for which there is a unique and strictly increasing personal equilibrium.23
22The term ∂qθu(q,θ)/f(θ) is a measure of heterogeneity of preferences. It increases if types are more
dispersed, and if the marginal utility depends more strongly on the demand type.
23It is straight forward to show that there is no strictly increasing personal equilibrium if Condition 1 is
violated. Furthermore, a personal equilibrium with bunching consists only of strictly increasing parts that
coincide with ˜ q, and ﬂat parts for which the end points coincide with ˜ q (cf. Lemma 4 in the appendix).
134.2. Participation and Flat-Rate Bias
Whether a consumer accepts the oﬀered two-part tariﬀ depends on the utility he expects
to enjoy with this contract. The consumer’s expected utility from accepting the two-part
tariﬀ (p,L)—taking the personal equilibrium into account—is,
Eθ[U(ˆ q(θ,p)|θ, ˆ q(θ,p) )] =
  ¯ θ
θ
[u(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) − pˆ q(θ,p)]f(θ) dθ − L
− λp




[ˆ q(θ,p) − ˆ q(φ,p)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ . (5)
The ﬁrst term of this expression represents expected intrinsic utility. The second term
is the ex ante expected loss, which is weighted by λ. The expected loss vanishes if the
unit price goes to zero. Moreover, the expected loss is relatively low if demand does not
vary signiﬁcantly across diﬀerent demand types. If, on the other hand, demand is highly
uncertain, then a loss averse consumer who subscribed to a measured tariﬀ expects to
incur severe losses, which reduces his willingness to pay for the contract.
The expected losses that a loss-averse consumer incurs with a measured tariﬀ make
him biased in favor of ﬂat-rate tariﬀs. This bias can be so severe that the consumer favors
a ﬂat rate over a measured tariﬀ, although the average bill under the measured tariﬀ for
satiated consumption is lower than the basic charge of the ﬂat rate. We deﬁne a consumer’s
preferences as “ﬂat-rate biased,” if for any ﬂat-rate tariﬀ (p = 0), there exists a measured
tariﬀ (p > 0) such that (i) ex ante the consumer prefers the ﬂat-rate contract, and (ii) the
expected bill for satiated consumption under the measured tariﬀ is lower than the basic
charge of the ﬂat rate.
Proposition 2 (Flat-Rate Bias). A loss-averse consumer (λ > 0) with uncertain demand
has ﬂat-rate biased preferences.
Proposition 2 shows that for each ﬂat-rate contract, there is some measured tariﬀ, such
that the consumers prefer the ﬂat rate although the expected payment under the measured
tariﬀ is lower. A natural question is whether this ﬂat-rate bias can also arise if we restrict
attention to two-part tariﬀs that are oﬀered by a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist. In Section
7.1, we provide an example of a monopolist who faces two groups of consumers that diﬀer
in their degrees of loss aversion and in the distributions of their demand types. The optimal
menu of two-part tariﬀs includes a measured tariﬀ and a ﬂat rate, and we show that the
loss-averse consumers exhibit the ﬂat-rate bias. They prefer the ﬂat rate even though
the basic charge is greater than the expected payment of satiated consumption under the
measured tariﬀ. Hence, when choosing the ﬂat rate, the consumers pay a premium in
order to be insured against variations in payments.
145. The Optimality of Flat-Rate Tariffs
The monopolist maximizes expected revenues minus expected costs subject to the con-
straint that consumers voluntarily accept the two-part tariﬀ.
max
L,p≥0
L + (p − c)
  ¯ θ
θ
ˆ q(θ,p)f(θ)dθ
subject to Eθ [U(ˆ q(θ,p)|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) )] ≥ 0.
For any unit price p, the optimal ﬁxed fee is determined by the binding participation
constraint. Thus, the monopolist’s tariﬀ choice problem can be restated as a problem of
choosing only the unit price p. Since there is no asymmetric information at the contracting
stage, the monopolist can extract the entire expected gains from trade net of expected loss
utility. The optimal unit price p∗ maximizes the joint surplus of the two contracting parties
which we denote by S(p):
S(p) =
  ¯ θ
θ
 
u(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) − cˆ q(θ,p) − pλ
  θ
θ
[ˆ q(θ,p) − ˆ q(φ,p)]f(φ)dφ
 
f(θ) dθ. (6)
Without loss aversion (λ = 0), the joint surplus equals the consumers’ expected intrinsic
utility minus the ﬁrm’s expected costs of production. Ex ante, a loss-averse consumer
expects to feel a loss if tariﬀ payments depend on the purchased quantities and demand
diﬀers across types. This expected loss reduces the joint surplus. When choosing the
optimal unit price, the monopolist faces a trade-oﬀ between maximizing standard eﬃciency
and minimizing the consumers’ expected losses. Intuitively, for a high degree of loss
aversion, minimizing expected losses is more important whereas for a high marginal cost,
maximizing standard eﬃciency is more important.
If Condition 1 is violated, the personal equilibrium is not unique and S(p) depends on
the selected equilibrium. The next lemma shows that we can focus on cases in which the
personal equilibrium is unique, as long as the marginal cost is not too high.
Lemma 1. Suppose the marginal cost c > 0 is suﬃciently low. Then the joint surplus
S(p) is maximized for a unit price p ∈ [0, ¯ p).
For low marginal costs, a high unit price p > ¯ p leads to severe underconsumption
compared to the ﬁrst-best quantities. Furthermore, the joint surplus is decreased by losses
that the consumers may feel. A ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, on the other hand, eliminates losses, and
the eﬃciency loss due to overconsumption is also small, if the marginal cost is small.
Therefore, prices p > ¯ p are dominated by a ﬂat rate if marginal costs are not too high.
Lemma 1 does not provide an explicit bound on c. The range of marginal cost levels for
which the personal equilibrium is unique, however, is increasing in ¯ p. Hence, uniqueness
is guaranteed for a large range of marginal cost levels, if preference heterogeneity is high.
In what follows, we assume that c is such that p < ¯ p is optimal. Hence, we can focus
on the case that the personal equilibrium  ˆ q(θ,p) θ∈Θ is characterized by Proposition 1.
15Using integration by parts and equation (4) allows us to write the derivative of the joint
surplus with respect to the marginal price p as
S′(p) =













If the consumer has standard preferences (λ = 0), then the ﬁrst-order condition S′(p) = 0
is satisﬁed for marginal cost pricing, i.e. p∗ = c. In any case, for p > c/[1+λ(1−F(θ))] the
joint surplus is strictly decreasing in p. Thus, p∗ ∈ [0,c/[1+λ(1−F(θ))]]. Without further
assumptions, however, the joint surplus is not necessarily quasi concave. The following
assumption guarantees strict concavity for p ∈ [0,c/[1 + λ(1 − F(θ))]].24
Assumption 2. (i) λ ≤ 1 (no dominance of loss utility).
(ii) ∂qqqu(q,θ) ≤ 0 (convex demand).
In order to ensure concavity, we have to rule out that a higher unit price leads to
a reduction in expected losses, which may happen due to a highly compressed demand
proﬁle. A higher unit price has two eﬀects on expected losses. On the one hand, it
increases expected losses due to increased variations in payments for a given demand
function. On the other hand, consumers react to the higher unit price by choosing a more
compressed demand function, which reduces expected losses. In summary, Assumption 2
ensures that the direct eﬀect on expected losses is always stronger than the indirect eﬀect.
Assumption 2 is by far not necessary for ﬂat-rate tariﬀs to be optimal. If S(p) is
concave, however, S′(p) ≤ 0 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for optimality of a
ﬂat rate. This condition is easy to interpret and allows us to make statements about
comparative statics. To cut back on our lengthy formulas we deﬁne
Σ(λ) := λ
  ¯ θ
θ
  θ
θ [qS(θ) − qS(φ)]f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ
−
  ¯ θ
θ ∂pˆ q(θ,0)f(θ)dθ
.
Note that ˆ q(θ,p) also depends on λ. Obviously, Σ(0) = 0. Moreover, it can be shown that
Σ(λ) is strictly increasing in λ and thus Σ(λ) > 0 for λ > 0. Noting that S′(0) ≤ 0 is
equivalent to Σ(λ) ≥ c, we state the main result of this section.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, the monopolist optimally oﬀers a
ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, i.e. p∗ = 0, if and only if Σ(λ) ≥ c. Moreover, Σ′(λ) > 0.
According to Proposition 3, if the consumer is loss averse, then a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is
optimal for suﬃciently low marginal costs, since Σ(λ) > 0. On the one hand, a ﬂat-rate
tariﬀ eliminates losses on the side of the consumer, which increases his willingness to pay
for the contract. On the other hand, a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ leads to an ineﬃciently high level of
24No dominance of loss utility is also imposed for instance by Herweg et al. (2010). In our setup, λ = 1
corresponds to the conventional estimate of 2 − 1 loss aversion.
16consumption which is costly to the ﬁrm. If the degree of loss aversion is high and marginal
costs are low, the positive eﬀect due to minimized losses outweighs the negative eﬀect of
higher production costs due to overconsumption, and thus a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is optimal.
Moreover, the range of marginal cost values for which a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is optimal is
increasing in the consumer’s degree of loss aversion and in the uncertainty of demand.25 A
ﬂat-rate contract can be optimal only if demand is suﬃciently uncertain. The numerator
of Σ(λ) is a measure for the degree of demand variation. Intuitively, if all types have very
similar preferences, the monopolist can set a positive unit price such that all types consume
close to the eﬃcient quantity. At the same time expected losses are small because the
eﬃcient quantity varies very little. Thus, if all types have similar preferences, a measured
tariﬀ is optimal. Conversely, strong variation in satiation points increases Σ(λ) and makes
a ﬂat rate optimal for a wider range of marginal cost levels.26
Finally, a measured tariﬀ is optimal if demand reacts sensitively to price changes. The
denominator of Σ(λ) measures how strong on average a consumer’s demand reacts to an
increase of the unit price slightly above zero. A positive unit price reduces costly over-
consumption compared to a ﬂat rate. On the other hand, it introduces losses felt by the
consumer. When demand reacts strongly to price changes, the reduction of overconsump-
tion dominates and a measured tariﬀ is more likely to be optimal.
Example 1. To illustrate the optimality of ﬂat-rate tariﬀs and in particular to highlight
the importance of demand uncertainty, suppose that θ ∼ U[µ − σ,µ + σ] with µ + σ >
µ − σ > ε > 0. The mean of the demand type distribution is E[θ] = µ and the variance
is V[θ] = (1/3)σ2. Let the intrinsic utility function for the good be given by ˆ u(q,θ) =
θq − (1/2)q2. Here, the only parameter that aﬀects demand uncertainty is the size of the
support of the type distribution (given by σ).27
For p < ¯ p = 2σ/λ, the personal equilibrium is unique and demand is strictly increasing
in the demand type. Solving (4) yields




















For p > ¯ p, Condition 1 is violated and there are multiple personal equilibria. In all of
these personal equilibria, all demand types θ ∈ [µ−σ,µ+σ] consume the same amount ¯ q,
with (µ+σ)−p(1+λ) ≤ ¯ q ≤ (µ−σ)−p.28 At p = ¯ p the two bounds coincide. Moreover,
evaluated at p = ¯ p, we obtain that ˆ q(¯ p,θ) equals the unique value ¯ q for all θ.
In this example, the joint surplus is a quasi-concave function for all unit prices where
25Note, however, that Σ(λ) is not linear in λ. For very high cost levels, there may be no λ such that a
ﬂat rate is optimal. The example at the end of this section illustrates this point.
26Equation (1) shows that the diﬀerence between two satiation points is increasing in the cross derivative
of the intrinsic utility function.
27Keeping σ constant and varying the cross derivative of ˆ u would have the same qualitative eﬀects.
28This follows from Lemma 4 in the appendix and the fact that ˜ q is decreasing for p ≥ ¯ p. See also
Footnote 23.
17demand is positive, including p > ¯ p.29 Thus, a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is optimal if and only if







Note that Σ′(λ) > 0 and limλ→∞ = (2/3)σ.
Result 1. Consider the speciﬁcations of the example. A ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is optimal if either
the marginal cost is suﬃciently low or demand is suﬃciently uncertain. A high degree of
loss aversion makes it more “likely” that a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is optimal. An arbitrarily high
degree of loss aversion, however, is not suﬃcient to ensure optimality of a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ.
6. General Nonlinear Tariffs
In this section, we relax the restriction to two-part tariﬀs. The monopolist can now oﬀer
a general tariﬀ T(q) to the consumers. We ﬁnd that the main insights from the analysis of
two-part tariﬀs are robust. A ﬂat part in the optimal tariﬀ arises if (i) the consumers are
suﬃciently loss averse, (ii) there is suﬃcient variation in preferences and thus suﬃcient
demand uncertainty, and (iii) the marginal cost is not too high. On the other hand, we
show that a monopolist who is not restricted to two-part tariﬀs does not oﬀer a fully ﬂat
tariﬀ. The optimal tariﬀ is increasing at the lower end, and at the upper end of the range
of quantities demanded by consumers. Flat parts arise for intermediate quantities.
The formal derivation of the results can be found in the web appendix. To simplify
the analysis, we augment Assumption 1 by
Assumption 3. ∂qqθˆ u(q,θ) < 0, for all θ ∈ Θ and all q ≥ 0.
Applying the revelation principle, we can restrict the monopolist’s oﬀer to the class of
direct mechanisms  q(θ),P(θ) θ∈Θ for which truth-telling is a personal equilibrium.30 As
in the case of two-part tariﬀs, the personal equilibrium constraints imply that q(θ) and
P(θ) must be non-decreasing.
We deﬁne V (θ,φ) as the utility of a consumer with true type φ who pretends to be of
type θ, given he expected ex ante to reveal his type truthfully. By monotonicity, this can
be written as
V (θ,φ) = u(q(θ),φ) − P(θ) − λ
  θ
θ
[P(θ) − P(z)]f(z) dz.
29For p ≥ ¯ p a personal equilibrium has to be selected. K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006) deﬁne the preferred
personal equilibrium as the plan among all credible plans—personal equilibria—that maximizes the decision
maker’s ex ante expected utility. If we select the preferred personal equilibrium demand is given by
q
ppe(p) = max{(µ − σ) − p,0}.
30The tariﬀ T(q), can be recovered from a mechanism  q(θ),P(θ) : T(q) = P(inf{θ|q(θ) ≥ q}).
18The monopolist’s problem is then given by:
max
 q(θ),P(θ) θ∈Θ
  ¯ θ
θ
[P(θ) − cq(θ)]f(θ) dθ
subject to Eθ[V (θ,θ)] ≥ 0, (IR)
and φ ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
V (θ,φ), ∀ φ ∈ Θ. (PE)
The monopolist maximizes expected revenues minus production costs. The individual
rationality constraint (IR) ensures that consumers voluntarily accept the mechanism at
the contracting stage. (PE) ensures that truth-telling is a personal equilibrium.






Given this, we observe that ﬂat parts in the payment schedule can arise (a) due to bunching
in the quantity dimension (q′(θ) = 0) or (b) due to a quantity schedule that coincides with
the satiation point (∂qu(q(θ),θ) = 0). We focus on the latter case which has the feature
that not only the payment schedule as a function of the type (P(θ)) is ﬂat, but also the
tariﬀ that maps quantities into payments (T(q)) has a ﬂat part.











By Assumption 3, this equation has a solution—there exists a ˜ q(θ) < qS(θ) that solves







Assumption 3 also implies uniqueness of the solution if it exists. If (12) is violated, the





˜ q(θ), if (12) is fulﬁlled for θ,
qS(θ), otherwise.
Moreover, we deﬁne P∗(θ) as the payment rule that satisﬁes the (IR) constraint with
equality and equation (10). Now we can state the main result of this section.
Proposition 4. If q∗ is strictly increasing, then (q∗,P∗) is an optimal solution to the
monopolist’s problem.
31In the web appendix, we show that the optimal mechanism is absolutely continuous and that the
revenue equivalence formula is suﬃcient for (PE).
19Equations (11) and (12) reveal several observations about the location of ﬂat parts
in the tariﬀ, and about the distortions of the optimal quantity schedule compared to the
ﬁrst-best solution (∂qu(qFB(θ),θ) = c), which is optimal in the absence of loss aversion.
By equation (12), a ﬂat part is more likely for intermediate quantities, i.e. quantities which
are chosen by types in the middle of the type space. Conversely, for θ ∈ {θ, ¯ θ}, (12) is




c ⇒ q∗(θ) ∈ (qFB(θ),qS(θ)), if λ > 0,
∂qu(q∗(¯ θ), ¯ θ) = (λ + 1)c ⇒ q∗(¯ θ) < qFB(¯ θ), if λ > 0.
We see that the tariﬀ is never ﬂat for quantities chosen by very low or very high demand
types. We also observe that the coeﬃcient of c in the ﬁrst-order condition is increasing
in the type if λ > 0. This implies that (ignoring the eﬀect of the second term), the
quantity schedule becomes ﬂatter and more compressed if the consumer is loss averse.
The intuition is straight forward: a ﬂatter quantity schedule decreases the variation in
payments (cf. equation (10)) which decreases ex-ante expected losses.
The second term in the ﬁrst-order condition leads to an increase in the quantity con-
sumed by intermediate types if λ > 0. If (12) is violated, this increase is so large that
the optimal quantity coincides with the satiation point. In this case, the optimal tariﬀ
becomes ﬂat. A ﬂat part is particularly likely if c is small and consumers’ preferences
are suﬃciently heterogeneous at the satiation point (i.e. ∂qθu(qS(θ),θ)/f(θ) is large). In-
tuitively, the upward distortion of the quantity schedule arises because the variation in
payments depends on the marginal utility of consumption (cf. equation (10)). Increasing
the quantity consumed by a type θ to the satiation point, where the marginal utility is
zero, therefore makes the payment schedule ﬂat around θ. Compared to a situation where
P(θ) increases steeply around θ, this reduces the losses that types above θ feel compared
to types below θ. In the ex-ante surplus, the reduction in losses is weighted by the mass
of types that feel less losses (1 − F(θ)), times the weight of the types below θ in the loss
function (F(θ)). Hence, a ﬂat part is most likely to be observed in the middle of the type-
space where F(θ)(1 − F(θ)) is large. We conclude this section by a parametric example
that illustrates the main insights.
Example 2. Let ˆ u(q,θ) = qθ − (1/2)q2 and thus qS(θ) = θ. Let θ ∼ U[θ,θ + 1/d] so
that F(θ) = d(θ − θ) and f(θ) = d. The optimal quantity schedule is now given by
q∗(θ) = min
 
θ , θ −





(1 + λd(θ − θ))(1 − d(θ − θ))(θ − θ)
 
,
and we have q(¯ θ) = ¯ θ − (λ + 1)c and q(θ) = θ − c/(λ + 1).
In Figure 1, the optimal quantity schedules are plotted for diﬀerent combinations of
loss aversion λ ∈ {0.3,0.6} and preference heterogeneity d ∈ {0.5,1}. Moreover, we
set c = 0.1 and θ = 1. In panel (a), loss aversion is high (λ = 0.6) and preference














(a) quantity q∗(θ) (λ = 0.6, Θ = [1,2]) (b) payment P∗(θ) (λ = 0.6, Θ = [1,2])













(c) quantity q∗(θ) (λ = 0.6, Θ = [1,3]) (d) quantity q∗(θ) (λ = 0.3, Θ = [1,2])
Figure 1: Quantity schedules: satiation (dotted), ﬁrst-best (dashed), optimal (solid).
heterogeneity is low (d = 1). We see that about 2/5 of the types are satiated. For the
quantities consumed by these types, the tariﬀ is ﬂat (panel (b)). If we increase preference
heterogeneity by stretching the support of θ (panel (c)), this fraction increases to more
than 3/4. Conversely, if we keep preference heterogeneity ﬁxed and decrease loss aversion
to λ = 0.3, the ﬂat part in the tariﬀ vanishes and no demand type is satiated.
7. Extensions and Robustness
In this section, we go back to the setting of Sections 3–5 in which the monopolist is
restricted to two-part tariﬀs and discuss several extensions.
7.1. Heterogeneous Consumers
First, we relax the assumption of an ex-ante homogeneous group of consumers. Exper-
imental evidence shows that people diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to their degrees of
loss aversion, see for instance Choi et al. (2007). In line with our previous analysis, we
posit that the degree of loss aversion is a stable preference parameter that is known to
consumers already at the contracting stage. We suppose that there are two groups of
consumers denoted by j = 1,2, with 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2. Consumers from group one are less loss
21averse than consumers from group two. The degree of loss aversion is private information.
Otherwise, the model stays the same. In particular, we abstract from heterogeneity in
the distribution of demand types. The monopolist now oﬀers a menu of two-part tariﬀs,
Tj(q) = Lj + pjq, j = 1,2, where Lj is the basic charge, and pj is the unit price of the
tariﬀ intended for group j. The timing of the game is the same as before.
To analyze the robustness of our ﬁndings regarding the optimality of ﬂat-rate contracts,
we focus on cases where the monopolist would oﬀer a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ under symmetric in-
formation, i.e., we assume Σ(λ2) ≥ c. In these cases, the monopolist can screen diﬀerently
loss-averse consumers at no cost. A characterization of the optimal menu of two-part
tariﬀs for the case Σ(λ2) < c is outside the scope this paper.
Since the degree of loss aversion is private information, the monopolist has to ensure
that each type selects the contract that is intended for him. Suppose that the monopolist
oﬀers the tariﬀs T1 and T2, that would be optimal for the respective groups in the absence
of self-selection constraints (i.e. the optimal tariﬀs from Section 5). If a ﬂat rate is optimal
for both groups, T1 and T2 are identical and self-selection constraints are trivially fulﬁlled.
It turns out that this is also the case if T1 is a measured tariﬀ.




Eθ[U(ˆ q(θ,p)|θ, q(θ,p) )]
 
≤ 0.
According to Lemma 2, consumers from group two derive lower expected utility from
choosing T1 than consumers from group one because they are more loss averse. Intuitively,
higher loss aversion increases the losses felt by a consumer, and leads to a more distorted
quantity choice under a measured tariﬀ. Both eﬀects reduce the ex ante expected utility.
As the optimal contract T1 leaves no rent to consumers from group one, Lemma 2 implies
that consumers from group two must strictly prefer the ﬂat rate. On the other hand,
the expected utility from signing a ﬂat-rate contract is independent of the degree of loss
aversion, and therefore it equals zero for both consumer groups. This shows that the less
loss-averse consumers are indiﬀerent between the two tariﬀs. In summary, the monopolist
can screen consumers with respect to their degree of loss aversion at no cost.
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds for both consumer groups.
(i) If Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2), then the monopolist oﬀers a measured tariﬀ (p∗
1,L∗
1) next to a
ﬂat-rate contract (0,LF). The measured tariﬀ is signed by consumers of group one
while consumers of group two sign the ﬂat-rate contract.
(ii) If c ≤ Σ(λ1) < Σ(λ2), then the monopolist oﬀers only a ﬂat-rate contract (0,LF)
which is signed by consumers of both groups.
The tariﬀs (p∗
1,L∗
1) and (0,LF) are characterized by: S′(p∗
1|λ1) = 0, L∗
1 = S(p∗
1|λ1) + (c −
p∗
1)
  ¯ θ
θ ˆ q(θ,p∗
1)f(θ)dθ, and LF = S(0) + c
  ¯ θ
θ qS(θ)f(θ)dθ, with p∗
1 ∈ (0,c] and L∗
1 < LF.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 identiﬁes a case in which the monopolist oﬀers a ﬂat-rate
contract next to a measured tariﬀ. Thus, consumer heterogeneity with respect to the
22degree of loss aversion provides one possible answer to the question why ﬁrms oﬀer ﬂat
rates next to measured tariﬀs. If the degree of loss aversion of both groups is above the
threshold given by Σ(λ) = c, then the monopolist oﬀers only a ﬂat-rate contract.
One could also relax the assumption that, ex ante, consumers diﬀer only in their
degrees of loss aversion. If consumer groups also diﬀer in their demand-type distributions,
the monopolist faces a sequential screening problem with loss-averse consumers.32 To
illustrate the complications that can arise in this setting, suppose that there are two
groups of consumers. For simplicity, assume that both groups have the same degree of
loss aversion. Suppose further, that the demand of group one is low on average but fairly
uncertain such that it would be optimal to oﬀer a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to these consumers.
Finally, suppose that the demand of group two is high on average but rather certain, so
that it would be optimal for the monopolist to oﬀer a measured tariﬀ to consumers of group
two. If consumers are privately informed about their demand distributions, this menu of
tariﬀs would not be incentive compatible. The high demand consumers of group two would
prefer the ﬂat rate intended only for consumers of group one. If, on the other hand, the
correlation between average demand and demand uncertainty is reversed, oﬀering a ﬂat
rate next to a measured tariﬀ can again be optimal.
In summary, whether the optimal menu of two-part tariﬀs comprises a ﬂat-rate option
depends on the precise nature of heterogeneity. In the following example, consumers are
heterogeneous both with respect to the demand distribution and the degree of loss aversion.
In this example it is optimal to oﬀer a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to consumers with low demand and
high uncertainty because they are suﬃciently more loss averse than the consumers from
the other group. This shows that the simple intuition from the discussion above can break
down if there is heterogeneity also in the degree of loss aversion. Moreover, the example
exhibits the empirically observed ﬂat-rate bias.
Example 3. We extend Example 1 and assume that there are two groups of consumers
indexed by j = 1,2. The utility function and the parametrization of the type distribution
are the same, except that we choose diﬀerent parameters for the two groups. Let (µ1,σ1) =
(1.3,0.1) and (µ2,σ2) = (1.17,1). Moreover, we assume that loss aversion is low in group
one, λ1 = 0.3, and high in group two, λ2 = 0.6. The marginal cost of the monopolist
is c = 0.1. We calculate the optimal two-part tariﬀ for each group in isolation (see
Section 5). For group one, the optimal tariﬀ has a positive unit price and is given by
(L1,p1) ≈ (0.744,0.081). For group two, it is optimal to oﬀer a ﬂat rate with basic charge
L2 ≈ 0.851. With this menu of tariﬀs, consumers from group one strictly prefer the
measured tariﬀ and consumers from group two strictly prefer the ﬂat rate. This example
demonstrates the ﬂat-rate bias. For consumers of group two, the expected payment for
satiated consumption under the measured tariﬀ is approximately 0.839 which is lower than
32See Courty and Li (2000) for the seminal paper on sequential screening in the standard framework.
23the basic charge of the ﬂat rate. Consumers from group two pay a premium in order to
be insured against variable payments that arise under the measured tariﬀ.
7.2. Competition
Now, we brieﬂy investigate the eﬀect of competition on the proﬁt-maximizing two-part
tariﬀ.33 Analyzing the impact of competition on the structure of the optimal contract is
insightful, because other ﬁndings regarding ﬁrms’ pricing strategies when facing loss-averse
consumers crucially depend on the degree of competition. For instance, in Heidhues and
K˝ oszegi (2008), there exists a focal price equilibrium, i.e., diﬀerentiated ﬁrms with diﬀerent
marginal costs charge the same focal price, only if competition is soft.34 Competition takes
place at the contracting stage and aﬀects a consumer’s outside option. With competition,
the outside option does not yield zero expected utility but rather ¯ u > 0, the expected
utility arising from the best alternative oﬀer. Competing ﬁrms oﬀer alternative two-part
tariﬀs for the good, say the rental car, which increases ¯ u. A higher degree of competition
corresponds to a higher ¯ u. Notice, that the outside option is only a positive constant in the
participation constraint of the ﬁrm’s optimization problem. Thus, the optimal marginal
price p∗ does not depend on the degree of competition. Competition only aﬀects the
basic charge L, which decreases if competition becomes more intense. In the limit—under
perfect competition—L is determined by a zero proﬁt condition.
Result 2. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and consider a perfectly competitive market
with homogeneous consumers. The equilibrium contract (p∗,L∗) is a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ if and
only if Σ(λ) ≥ c, with p∗ = 0 and L∗ = c
  ¯ θ
θ qS(θ)f(θ)dθ.
7.3. Loss Aversion in Both Dimensions
In this part, we assume that the consumers have reference-dependent preferences in the
good dimension and in the money dimension. We posit that a consumer is disappointed
if his intrinsic utility from consumption, u(q,θ), falls short of his reference point. The
universal loss function for both dimensions is µ(x) = λx, for x > 0 and zero otherwise.
Moreover, we modify Assumption 1 by positing that the intrinsic utility for the good,
evaluated at the satiation point, is constant.
∀ θ ∈ Θ u(qS(θ),θ) ≡ ¯ u. (13)
This implies that higher demand types achieve lower utility levels, i.e., ∂θˆ u(q,θ) < 0. The
rest of Assumption 1 remains unchanged. In particular, higher types still have stronger
preferences for the good and the satiation point is strictly increasing in the demand type.
33A formal model of imperfect competition is analyzed in the web appendix.
34Similarly, in Heidhues and K˝ oszegi (2010a), a ﬁrm optimally sets variable sales prices next to sticky
regular prices only if it has suﬃcient market power.
24The utility function ˆ u(q,θ) = θq − (1/2)q2 − (1/2)θ2 + χ = −(1/2)[qS(θ) − q]2 + χ, where
χ is chosen such that Eθ[u(0,θ)] = 0 and qS(θ) = θ, is of the form described above.
We posited that a consumer’s well-being when consuming his ideal quantity is inde-
pendent of the demand type. Intuitively, the consumer’s utility does not depend on his
absolute consumption level, but rather on the diﬀerence between his ideal and his actual
consumption level. For instance, a customer of a telephone service provider may want to
make an uncertain number of calls in each billing period. If he can make all calls he wants
to, he achieves a constant level of happiness, independent of the actual number of calls.
Here, a higher θ corresponds to an inferior demand type, a state where the consumer has
to make many telephone calls and suﬀers a lot if he cannot do so.
If a consumer is loss averse also in the good dimension and the utility of not consuming
the good at all is uncertain, the value of the outside option depends on the degree of loss
aversion. When rejecting the contract, the consumer’s expected utility is given by
Eθ[U(0|θ, 0 )] =






[u(0,φ) − u(0,θ)]f(φ) dφ
 
f(θ) dθ ≡ K(λ), (14)
with K′(λ) < 0.
Suppose that the consumer accepted a two-part tariﬀ (p,L) and that his expected
demand is ˆ q( ,p). If demand type θ is realized and the consumer demands quantity q then
he feels a loss in the money dimension compared to the demand types in the set X(q) =
{z ∈ Θ|q > ˆ q(z,p)}. Similarly, the set of demand types compared to which the consumer
feels a loss in the good dimension, is denoted by Y (q,θ) = {z ∈ Θ|u(q,θ) < u(ˆ q(z,p),z)}.
Obviously X is increasing in q while Y is decreasing in q. Moreover, Y is increasing in θ.
If demand type θ is realized and the consumer demands quantity q, then his utility is












q − ˆ q(z,p)
 
f(z) dz. (15)
The analysis of losses in both dimensions is more challenging because the set Y does not
only depend on q but also on the demand type θ. It is intricate to narrow down the set of
potential personal equilibria or to show uniqueness.35 Since we are mainly interested in the
robustness of our ﬁndings, we construct only one personal equilibrium demand function
with reasonable properties. The demand function should be continuous in θ, since the
utility function, the type space, and the two-part tariﬀ are continuous. If the consumer
expects a continuous demand function  ˆ q(θ,p) , choosing a slightly higher or lower quantity
should have only a second-order eﬀect on the set of types compared to which the consumer
feels a loss in the good or the money dimension. Higher types have a higher intrinsic
preference of the good. This also implies that for high types, increased consumption
35In a slightly diﬀerent setting with a binary type space, Hahn et al. (2010) provide an example for a
personal equilibrium in which the high type consumes less than the low type.
25decreases the losses in the good dimension to a greater extent than for low types. Thus,
higher types should demand (weakly) more in a personal equilibrium. Moreover, it seems
reasonable that higher types do not consume so much more that they achieve higher
intrinsic utility levels than lower types. Thus, we posit that on the equilibrium path the
consumer feels losses in the good dimension as well as in the money dimension compared
to lower types. Given that higher types consume strictly more and are strictly worse oﬀ
compared to lower types, the personal equilibrium is characterized by
∂qu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) = p. (16)
The demand function characterized by (16) is increasing in the demand type. Whether
the second hypothesis—higher types achieve lower utility levels in equilibrium—is also
satisﬁed depends on the utility function. We restrict attention to the case that u(q,θ)
fulﬁlls this hypothesis.
Given that the personal equilibrium is characterized by (16), a ﬂat rate is optimal
under the same conditions as in the case without losses in the good dimension.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that the personal equilibrium de-
mand function is characterized by (16). Then, the monopolist optimally oﬀers a ﬂat-rate
tariﬀ if and only if Σ(λ) ≥ c.
In contrast to the case of loss aversion only in the money dimension, the demand
function is independent of the degree of loss aversion and thus Σ(λ) is linear in λ. Hence,
if the consumer’s degree of loss aversion is suﬃciently large, then a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is always
optimal. This is not the case with loss aversion only in the money dimension as was
illustrated in the example of Section 5.
Example 4. In order to obtain clear cut comparative static results regarding the op-
timality of ﬂat-rate tariﬀs, we consider the following example. Let the demand type be
uniformly distributed θ ∼ U[µ−σ,µ+σ] with µ−σ > 0. Suppose that intrinsic utility is
quadratic and given by ˆ u(q,θ) = θq − (1/2)q2 − (1/2)θ2 + χ, where χ = (1/6)[3µ2 + σ2].
The personal equilibrium demand function deﬁned by equation (16) is
ˆ q(θ,p) = θ − p. (17)
It can easily be veriﬁed that the demand function (17) indeed constitutes a personal equi-
librium. In this personal equilibrium, the intrinsic utility in the good dimension equals
u(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) = −(1/2)p2 and is independent of the demand type. As long as all types
demand a positive quantity, the joint surplus is strictly concave without additional as-
sumptions on the degree of loss aversion. Hence, a ﬂat rate is optimal when S′(p)|p=0 ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to
c ≤ (1/3)λσ = Σ(λ) . (18)
26As in the main part of the paper, the optimal two-part tariﬀ is a ﬂat rate when (i) the
marginal cost of production is low, (ii) the consumers are loss averse, and (iii) there is
enough variation in demand.
8. Conclusion
We developed a model of ﬁrm pricing and consumer choice, where consumers are loss averse
and uncertain about their own future demand. We showed that loss-averse consumers
are biased in favor of ﬂat-rate contracts: a loss-averse consumer may prefer a ﬂat-rate
contract to a measured tariﬀ before learning his preferences even though the expected
consumption would be cheaper with the measured tariﬀ than with the ﬂat rate. Moreover,
the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolistic supplier when consumers are loss averse is
analyzed. The optimal two-part tariﬀ is a ﬂat-rate contract if marginal costs are low and
if consumers value suﬃciently the insurance provided by the ﬂat-rate contract. A ﬂat-rate
contract insures a loss-averse consumer against ﬂuctuations in his billing amounts and
this insurance is particularly valuable when loss aversion is intense or demand is highly
uncertain. Thus, this paper provides one possible explanation for the prevalence of ﬂat-
rate tariﬀs. If the contract is not restricted to the class of two-part tariﬀs, the optimal
tariﬀ is not fully ﬂat. The optimal general tariﬀ contains a large ﬂat part for intermediate
quantities if marginal costs are low and demand of the loss-averse consumer is highly
uncertain.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Section 4
Without the assumption of a strictly increasing personal equilibrium, the cutoﬀ type α(q)
is given by
α(q) = inf{θ|ˆ q(θ,p) ≥ q}.
With this new deﬁnition, the consumer’s utility function at the consumption stage is
formally unchanged:
U(q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) ) = u(q,θ) − pq − L − λp
  α(q)
θ
[q − ˆ q(φ,p)]f(φ)dφ
We need two lemmas to prove Proposition 1.
Lemma 3. Let  ˆ q(θ,p)  be a personal equilibrium. Then ˆ q is a continuous function of θ.
Proof. The utility function U(q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) ) is continuous in (q,θ). By Assumption 1, it is
strictly concave in q for q ≤ qS(θ) and strictly decreasing for q ≥ qS(θ). Hence it has a
unique maximum which is continuous in θ by the theorem of the maximum.36
36We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this proof.
27By continuity of ˆ q, α is strictly increasing for q ∈ (ˆ q(θ,p), ˆ q(¯ θ,p)).
Lemma 4. Let  ˆ q(θ,p)  be a personal equilibrium. Suppose ˆ q(θ,p) = ¯ q for all θ in a
maximal interval I = [a,b]. Then ˜ q(b,p) ≤ ¯ q ≤ ˜ q(a,p).
Proof. Fix θ ∈ (a,b). Since U(q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) ) is concave it has left and right derivatives at
¯ q which are given by
∂−
q U(¯ q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) ) = ∂qu(¯ q,θ) − p(1 + λF(a)),
and ∂+
q U(¯ q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) ) = ∂qu(¯ q,θ) − p(1 + λF(b)).
Suppose by contradiction that ¯ q > ˜ q(a,p). Then, by concavity of u(q,θ) as a function of
q,
∂qu(¯ q,a) − p(1 + λF(a)) < ∂qu(˜ q(a,p),a) − p(1 + λF(a)) = 0
By Assumption 1, ∂−
q U(¯ q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) ) ≈ ∂qu(¯ q,a)−(1+λF(a)) for θ close to a. Hence, all
types θ close to a strictly prefer to consume less than ¯ q. This is a contradiction. Supposing
that ¯ q < ˜ q(b,p) leads to a similar contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1. If Condition 1 holds, ˜ q(θ,p) is strictly increasing in θ. Therefore,
by Lemma 4, every personal equilibrium ˆ q(θ,p) is strictly increasing in θ. Hence, as
argued in the text, ˆ q(θ,p) must satisfy (4) for almost every θ. By continuity of ˜ q(θ,p) (by
Assumption 1) and ˆ q(θ,p) (by Lemma 3), we have ˆ q(θ,p) = ˜ q(θ,p). Since U(q|θ, ˆ q(φ,p) )
is strictly concave, the ﬁrst-order condition (4) is also suﬃcient, which proves existence.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let (LF,0) be a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ and let (L,p) with 0 < p < ¯ p be a
measured tariﬀ. The measured tariﬀ leads to lower expenditures than the ﬂat rate if
LF − L − p
  ¯ θ
θ
qS(θ)f(θ) dθ > 0. (A.1)
The consumer prefers the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ ex ante if
  ¯ θ
θ
[u(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) − pˆ q(θ,p)]f(θ) dθ − L − λpχ(p) <
  ¯ θ
θ
u(qS(θ),θ)f(θ) dθ − LF, (A.2)
with
χ(p) =




[ˆ q(θ,p) − ˆ q(φ,p)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ > 0. (A.3)




LF − L − p







  ¯ θ
θ
[u(qS(θ),θ) − u(ˆ q(θ,p),θ)]f(θ) dθ −
  ¯ θ
θ
[qS(θ) − ˆ q(θ,p)]f(θ) dθ. (A.4)
28Let L be such that the expenditure savings from the measured tariﬀ are pε with ε > 0, i.e.,
LF − L − p
  ¯ θ
θ qS(θ)f(θ) dθ = pε. By construction, for all p > 0 and ε > 0 the consumer
would save money with the measured tariﬀ option. Thus, if we can always ﬁnd positive
values for p and ε such that (A.4) is fulﬁlled, then the consumer’s preferences are ﬂat-rate
biased. The left-hand side of inequality (A.4) equals ε by deﬁnition. For p → 0, the right-
hand side is at least as great as λ
  ¯ θ
θ
  θ
θ [qS(θ) − qS(φ)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ > 0. Thus, we can
always ﬁnd p > 0 and ε > 0—both suﬃciently small—such that (A.4) holds if λ > 0.
A.2. Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that any personal equilibrium is bounded from above by
qMAX(p), which is implicitly deﬁned by ∂qu(qMAX, ¯ θ) = p. Let qFB(θ) denote the ﬁrst-
best quantities, i.e., ∂qu(qFB(θ),θ) = c. We now show that for p ≥ ¯ p the joint surplus
S(p) is bounded from above and that this bound is lower than S(0). We deﬁne ˇ q(θ) :=
min{qFB(θ),qMAX(¯ p)}. There is a positive mass of types for which ˇ q(θ) = qMAX(¯ p) if
¯ p > c. The joint surplus generated with a unit price p ≥ ¯ p is less than or equal
ˇ S =
  ¯ θ
θ
 
u(ˇ q(θ),θ) − cˇ q(θ)
 
f(θ)dθ , (A.5)
because with a positive unit price the consumer may incur some losses. If S(0) ≥ ˇ S, then
S(p) is maximized by a unit price p ∈ [0, ¯ p). S(0) ≥ ˇ S is equivalent to
  ¯ θ
θ
 
u(qS(θ),θ) − u(ˇ q(θ),θ) − c[qS(θ) − ˇ q(θ)]
 
f(θ)dθ ≥ 0 . (A.6)
This condition is satisﬁed for c suﬃciently small, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. As argued in the main text, S′(p) < 0 for p ≥ c/(1+λ(1−F(θ))).
Next we show that S′′(p) ≤ 0 for p ≤ c/(1 + λ(1 − F(θ))). S′′( ) is given by
S′′(p) =
  ¯ θ
θ
{[p(1 + λ(1 − F(θ)) − c]∂ppˆ q(θ,p) + [1 + 2λ − 3λF(θ)]∂pˆ q(θ,p)}f(θ) dθ.
(A.7)
(A.7) is negative because ∂pˆ q(θ,p) < 0, λ ≤ 1, and by Assumption 2,
∂ppˆ q(θ,p) = −
(1 + λF(θ))∂qqqu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ)∂pˆ q(θ,p)
(∂qqu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ))2 ≥ 0,
Next, we show that S′(0) ≤ 0 is equivalent to Σ(λ) ≥ c. By evaluating (7) at p = 0, it
is obvious that S′(0) ≤ 0 if and only if
−c
  ¯ θ
θ
∂pˆ q(θ,0)f(θ)dθ − λ




[ˆ q(φ,0) − ˆ q(θ,0)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ ≤ 0 .
Rearranging this inequality yields c ≤ Σ(λ).
29Finally, we show that Σ′(λ) > 0. To simplify notation, we deﬁne Z(λ) and N(λ) as
the numerator and the denominator, respectively, of the fraction of Σ( ). Thus,
Z(λ) ≡




[ˆ q(θ,0) − ˆ q(φ,0)]f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ, (A.8)
and N(λ) ≡ −
  ¯ θ
θ
∂pˆ q(θ,0)f(θ)dθ . (A.9)












In order to show that Σ′(λ) > 0, we analyze the parts separately. Since ∂λˆ q(θ,0) = 0,





















Since Z(λ) > 0, it remains to show that N(λ) − λN′(λ) > 0, which is equivalent to
−
  ¯ θ
θ
∂pˆ q(θ,0)f(θ)dθ + λ




f(θ)dθ > 0 ,
⇐⇒






The last inequality is satisﬁed since u( ) is a strictly concave function in q for q ≤ qS(θ).
A.3. Proofs of Section 7.1
Proof of Lemma 2. Deﬁne V (λ,θ) as the consumer’s surplus for a given demand type on
the personal equilibrium path. Formally,
V (λ,θ) = u(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) − pˆ q(θ,p) − L − λp
  θ
θ
[ˆ q(θ,p) − ˆ q(φ,p)]f(φ)dφ (A.12)
30Taking the derivative of V ( ,θ) with respect to λ yields
V ′(λ,θ) = ∂λˆ q(θ,p)[∂qu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) − p[1 + λF(θ)]]














ˆ q(φ,p)f(φ)dφ ≥ 0. (A.14)
This condition is satisﬁed, because ˆ q(θ,p) is non-decreasing in θ.
The consumer’s expected utility is given by Eθ[V (λ,θ)] =
  ¯ θ
θ V (λ,θ)f(θ)dθ. Hence,
the change in expected utility due to an increase in the consumer’s degree of loss aversion
is given by d
dλEθ[V (λ,θ)] =
  ¯ θ
θ V ′(λ,θ)f(θ)dθ ≤ 0.
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33Web Appendix
A. Supplementary Material to Section 6: General Nonlinear Tariffs
The consumer’s expected utility from accepting a direct mechanism  q(θ),P(θ)  for which
truth-telling is a personal equilibrium and q(θ) is increasing, is given by
Eθ[V (θ,θ)] =
  ¯ θ
θ
 
u(q(θ),θ) − P(θ) − λ
  θ
θ




  ¯ θ
θ
[u(q(θ),θ) − P(θ)]f(θ)dθ − λ
  ¯ θ
θ
  ¯ θ
θ
[P(z) − P(θ)]f(z)f(θ)dzdθ
Using integration by parts, the last term—the expected loss—can be simpliﬁed further.
  ¯ θ
θ




  ¯ θ
θ
  ¯ θ
θ
P(z)f(z)dz f(θ)dθ −
  ¯ θ
θ
P(θ)




  ¯ θ
θ
P(z)f(z)dz F(θ)





  ¯ θ
θ
−P(θ)f(θ)F(θ)dθ −















where ξ(θ) = 1 + λ(2F(θ) − 1).
We will formulate the monopolist’s problem as an optimal control problem. In order








and impose X(¯ θ) ≥ 0. Note that X(¯ θ) = Eθ[V (θ,θ)], X(θ) = 0 and
X′(θ) = {u(q(θ),θ) − P(θ)ξ(θ)}f(θ).
In order to solve the monopolist’s problem, we want to express the payment rule as a
function of the allocation rule. The integral version of the local PE constraint can be




∂θu(q(s),s)ds = u(q(θ),θ) − P(θ) − λ
  θ
θ
(P(θ) − P(z))f(z)dz. (A.2)






where ρ(θ) = 1 + λF(θ).
34Lemma 5. Let (q,P) be a mechanism such that q and P are absolutely continuous and
satisfy (A.3). Then (q,P) satisﬁes (PE).
Proof. Diﬀerentiating V (θ,φ) with respect to the report θ, we get
∂θV (θ,φ) = ∂qu(q(θ),φ)q′(θ) − P′(θ)ρ(θ)




≤ 0, if θ > φ,
≥ 0, if θ < φ.
Hence, truth-telling (θ = φ) maximizes V (θ,φ).
We cannot assume a priori, however, that P is absolutely continuous. Instead, we ﬁrst
solve the monopolist’s problem assuming that q is globally Lipschitz continuous (which
implies absolute continuity). The following Lemma shows that this also implies Lipschitz
continuity of P and hence absolute continuity.
Lemma 6. Let  q(θ),P(θ) θ∈Θ be a direct mechanism that satisﬁes (PE). If q is glob-
ally Lipschitz continuous and Assumption 1 is fulﬁlled, then P is also globally Lipschitz
continuous.
Proof. For θ1 < θ2, the personal equilibrium constraint implies












[P(θ2) − P(z)]f(z)dz + λ[P(θ1) − P(θ2)]F(θ1)
≤ u(q(θ2),θ2) − u(q(θ1),θ2)
≤ K (θ2 − θ1)
for some K < ∞, where the last line follows from Lipschitz continuity of q and u (As-
sumption 1).
Assuming Lipschitz continuity of q, we can restate the problem of the monopolistic




  ¯ θ
θ
[P(θ) − cq(θ)]f(θ) dθ




(ii) q′(θ) = v
(iii) X′(θ) = (u(q,θ) − P(θ)ξ(θ))f(θ)
(iv) v(θ) ∈ [0,K]
(v) q(θ) ≥ 0
(vi) X(θ) = X(¯ θ) = 0
(vii) q(θ) ≤ q∗(θ), ∀θ.
v is the control variable and P, q, and X are state variables. The state variable X
and constraints (iii) and (vi) are introduced to capture the participation constraint. The
constant K > 0 in constraint (iv) is the Lipschitz-constant.
In the control problem, we impose the additional assumption that q is Lipschitz contin-
uous with constant K. We will show that for K suﬃciently large, the constraint v(θ) ≤ K
is not binding in the solution to the control problem. The next Lemma shows that an
optimal solution for which v(θ) < K, is also an optimal solution to the seller’s problem
without the Lipschitz constraint.
Lemma 7. Let (P,q,X,v) be an optimal solution to the control problem for some K, that
satisﬁes
v(θ) < K, for all θ ∈ Θ.
Then (q,P) is an optimal solution to the monopolist’s problem without the assumption of
Lipschitz continuity.
Proof. Suppose  q∗(θ),P∗(θ) θ∈Θ is an optimal mechanism for the monopolist (q∗ need
not be Lipschitz continuous). If we extend q∗ to the real line by setting q∗(θ) = q∗(θ) for
θ < θ, and q∗(θ) = q∗(¯ θ) for θ > ¯ θ, we can approximate q∗ by
qk(θ) := k





This yields a sequence of functions (qk)k∈N such that qk is Lipschitz continuous with
constant k, and qk(θ) → q∗(θ) and q′
k(θ) → q∗′(θ) as k → ∞ for almost every θ. Using the
local PE constraint (i) and the participation constraint (vi), we deﬁne the corresponding
payment rules (Pk)k.
If we ignore the participation constraint and arbitrarily set the payment of the lowest
type to zero, we get a sequence of payments rules ( ˜ Pk)k. (Pk diﬀers from ˜ Pk by the constant
Pk(θ), which is determined by the participation constraint.) By Helly’s theorem, there
36exists a sub-sequence ( ˜ Pkn)n and an increasing function ˜ P, such that ˜ Pkn(θ) → ˜ P(θ) for
almost every θ. Furthermore (possibly after taking sub-sequences again), Pkn(θ) converges
to some value ˆ P(θ) if n → ∞. For θ > θ we deﬁne ˆ P(θ) = ˆ P(θ) + ˜ P(θ). By deﬁnition,
each mechanism in the sequence ( qkn(θ),Pkn(θ) θ∈Θ)n fulﬁlls the local PE constraint
and the participation constraint. Furthermore the sequence converges to the mechanism
 q∗(θ), ˆ P(θ) θ∈Θ. Since the sequence of mechanisms is bounded and converges almost
everywhere, the limit also fulﬁlls participation and PE constraints.
Next we show that ˆ P(θ) = P∗(θ). Denote the utility of type θ in the mechanism
 q∗(θ), ˆ P(θ) θ∈Θ by ˆ V (θ) and in the optimal mechanism by V ∗(θ). Deﬁne D(θ) = P∗(θ)−
ˆ P(θ). Since both mechanisms fulﬁll (A.2), we have D(θ) = ˆ V (θ) − V ∗(θ). Subtracting
(A.2) for the two mechanism yields




Hence, D is absolutely continuous. Diﬀerentiating and rearranging we get
D′(θ) = 0.
Therefore, D(θ)  = 0 is not possible because both mechanisms fulﬁll the individual ratio-
nality constraint with equality. We have shown that ˆ P = P∗.
Now let (q,P,X,v) be an optimal solution to the control problem such that v(θ) < K
for some K. Since the Lipschitz constraint for K is not binding for (q,P,X,v), the expected
revenue from (q,P) is at least as high as the revenue from (qkn,Pkn) for all kn > K.
As qkn(θ) and Pkn(θ) converge to q∗(θ) and P∗(θ) almost everywhere, the revenue from
(q,P) is also weakly greater than the revenue from (q∗,P∗). Hence, (q,P) is an optimal
mechanism.
The Hamiltonian corresponding to the above problem is given by




+ pX[u(q,θ) − Tξ(θ)]f(θ).
Applying the Pontryagin Maximum Principle (cf. Clarke, 1983) we obtain the following
necessary conditions for an optimal control. (pq, pP and pX are absolutely continuous
functions.)




   
   
= cf(θ) −
pP(θ)





ρ(θ) ∂qqˆ u(qS(θ),θ)qs′(θ), cf(θ)
 
, if q(θ) = qS(θ),
= cf(θ), if q(θ) > qS(θ).
(A.4)
p′
P(θ) = −f(θ) + pX(θ)ξ(θ)f(θ), (A.5)
p′
X(θ) = 0 (⇒ p′
X(θ) = pX). (A.6)
37(ii) optimality of control: for almost every θ ∈ Θ,
v(θ)

   
   
= K, if pq(θ) +
pP(θ)
ρ(θ) ∂qu(q(θ),θ) > 0,
∈ [0,K], if pq(θ) +
pP(θ)
ρ(θ) ∂qu(q(θ),θ) = 0,
= 0, if pq(θ) +
pP(θ)
ρ(θ) ∂qu(q(θ),θ) < 0.
(A.7)
(iii) transversality conditions:
pq(¯ θ) = pP(θ) = pP(¯ θ) = 0, (A.8)
pq(θ) ≤ 0 (“ = ” if q(θ) > 0), (A.9)
and pX(θ), pX(¯ θ) free (A.10)
Lemma 8. pX = 1 and pP(θ) = λ((F(θ)2 − F(θ))(< 0).
Proof. The adjoint equation for p′




−f(s) + pXf(s)ξ(θ)ds. (A.11)
Evaluating equation (A.11) at θ = ¯ θ and using the transversality condition for pP(¯ θ) we
obtain
  ¯ θ
θ
−f(s) + pXf(s)[1 + λ(2F(s) − 1)]ds = 0
⇔ −1 + pX[1 + λ
  ¯ θ
θ
(2F(s) − 1)f(s)ds] = 0
⇔ pX = 1.
Inserting pX = 1 into (A.5) and (A.11) we obtain
p′
P(θ) = λ(2F(θ) − 1)f(θ)
pP(θ) = λ[(F(θ))2 − F(θ)].
Denote the Lipschitz constants of ˜ q (from the main text) and qS by ˜ K and KS, re-
spectively. Our assumptions on the utility function guarantee that max{ ˜ K,KS} < ∞.
Lemma 9. If K > max{ ˜ K,KS}, then q(θ) ≤ qS(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction q(θ) > qS(θ) for all θ in a maximal interval (a,b) with
a < b. Equation (A.4) then implies that p′
q(θ) = cf(θ) for θ ∈ (a,b). If pq(θ) ≥ 0,
for some θ < b then we must have v(t) = K for all t ∈ (θ,b) and b = ¯ θ. This implies
pq(¯ θ) > 0 in contradiction to the transversality condition. Hence, we have pq(θ) < 0 for
all θ < a. This implies v(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (a,b) and since qS is increasing we must have
a = θ. But q(a) > qS(a) > 0 implies pq(a) = 0 by the transversality condition. This is a
contradiction.
38Lemma 10. Suppose that K > max{ ˜ K,KS}. If q(θ) = qS(θ) for all θ ∈ (a,b), a < b,




∂qqˆ u(qS(θ),θ)qS′(θ) ≤ 0. (A.12)
Proof. Since ∂qu(qS(θ),θ) = 0 and qS′(θ) ∈ (0,K), (A.7) implies that pq(θ) = 0 for all
θ ∈ [a,b]. Hence, p′
q(θ) = 0 and from (A.4) we obtain (A.12).
Next we derive properties of the optimal solution if q(θ) < qS(θ). Integrating (A.4),
yields



































































Lemma 11. If K > max{ ˜ K,KS}, then v(θ) < K for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction, that for all θ in a maximal interval (a,b), a < b, the
control variable is v(θ) = K. Then pq(θ) +
pP(θ)
ρ(θ) ∂qu(q(θ),θ) ≥ 0 with equality for θ ∈
{a,b}. If the endpoints are a = θ or b = ¯ θ, respectively, then equality follows from the
transversality conditions. Otherwise, it follows because (a,b) is chosen maximally and the
left-hand side of the inequality is continuous in θ. A strict inequality at an endpoint would
imply that the interval where v(θ) = K, extends beyond the endpoint.
We show that q(a) ≥ q∗(a) and q(b) ≤ q∗(b). First, suppose by contradiction that























39The strict inequality follows from q(a) < q∗(a) because for r close to a, q(θ) < q∗(θ) and
hence ∂qu(q(r),r) > ∂qu(q∗(r),r) by concavity of u and ∂qθu(q(θ),θ) ≥ ∂qθu(q∗(θ),θ) by
Assumption 3. The weak inequality follows from the deﬁnition of q∗. But this contradicts
u(θ) = K. Hence q(a) ≥ q∗(a). Similarly, it can be shown that q(b) ≤ q∗(b). But
q(a) ≥ q∗(a), q(b) ≤ q∗(b) and v(θ) = K for θ ∈ (a,b) cannot be fulﬁlled simultaneously if
K > max{ ˜ K,KS}.
Lemma 12. If q∗ is strictly increasing, then every optimal solution to the control problem
is strictly increasing.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction, that the control is zero (v(θ) = 0) on a maximal interval
(a,b). Then q(θ) < qS(θ) for θ ∈ (a,b) and pq(θ)+
pP(θ)
ρ(θ) ∂qu(q(θ),θ) ≤ 0, with equality for
θ = b and for θ = a unless a = θ and q(a) = 0. We ﬁrst show that q(a) = q∗(a). Suppose













∂qθu(q∗(r),r) dr ≤ 0
This implies pq(θ) +
pP(θ)
ρ(θ) ∂qu(q(θ),θ) < 0 and v(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (a, ¯ θ) if q∗ is strictly
increasing. Since pP(¯ θ) = 0, this implies pq(¯ θ) < 0 in contradiction to the transversality
condition. Hence q(a) ≥ q∗(a). If q(a) > q∗(a), we have q∗(a) = ˜ q(a) and q(a) > ˜ q(a).
Hence, using (A.13) we get pq(θ)+
pP(θ)
ρ(θ) ∂qu(q(θ),θ) > 0 for θ close to a which contradicts
v(θ) = 0. Similarly, we can show that q(b) ≥ q∗(b) which yields the desired contradiction
if q∗(θ) is strictly increasing.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider an optimal solution (q,P,X,v) to the control problem
for K > max{ ˜ K,KS}. By Lemmas 11 and 12, we have v(θ) ∈ (0,K). If q(θ) < qS(θ)
for all θ ∈ (a,b) this implies pq(θ) +
pP(θ)










Diﬀerentiating this with respect to θ yields for almost every θ ∈ (a,b):










































This is the opposite of condition (12) in the main paper. By Assumption 1 (A.14) has
a solution q(θ) < qS(θ) if and only if (A.12) is violated. Assumption 1 also guarantees









and hence q(θ) = qS(θ) fulﬁlls the necessary condition from the maximum principle.
We have shown that q∗(θ) fulﬁlls the necessary conditions for optimality and because
q(θ) ≤ qS(θ) it is the unique solution. Existence of a solution can be shown by stan-
dard techniques. Therefore, we have have constructed an optimal solution to the control
problem. By Lemma 7 it is also a solution to the general problem.
B. Supplementary Material to Section 7.2: Duopolistic Competition
B.1. Market Framework
In this part of the web appendix, a formal model of imperfect competition is considered.
Moreover, we allow for heterogeneity among consumers with respect to the degree of loss
aversion. Consider a market for one good or service where two ﬁrms, A and B, are active.
Moreover, there is a continuum of ex ante heterogeneous consumers whose measure is
normalized to one.
Players & Timing.—The consumers can be partitioned into two groups that diﬀer in
their degrees of loss aversion. Let the two groups be denoted by j = 1,2 with 0 ≤ λ1 < λ2.
The distribution of demand types is identical for both groups of loss-averse consumers. As
before, the demand type is unknown to consumers and ﬁrms at the point of contracting.
The two symmetric ﬁrms, A and B, produce at constant marginal cost c > 0 and
without ﬁxed cost. Each ﬁrm i = A,B oﬀers a two-part tariﬀ to each group of consumers
j = 1,2. The tariﬀ is given by Ti
j(q) = Li
j + pi
jq, where q ≥ 0 is the quantity, and Li
j and
pi
j denote the ﬁxed fee and the unit price, respectively, charged by ﬁrm i from consumers
of type j. We will analyze the symmetric information case in which ﬁrms can observe λ, as
well as the asymmetric information case in which λ is private information of the consumer.
The timing is as follows: (1) Firms simultaneously and independently oﬀer a menu
of two-part tariﬀs {(Li
j,pi
j)}j=1,2 to consumers. (2) Each consumer either signs exactly
one contract or none. (3) Each consumer privately observes his demand type. Thereafter,
41each consumer who accepted a contract chooses a quantity. (4) Finally, payments are
made according to the demanded quantities and the concluded contracts.
Discrete Choice Framework.—The products of the two ﬁrms are symmetrically diﬀer-
entiated. We assume that, next to λ, consumers are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to
their brand preferences. Each consumer has idiosyncratic preferences for diﬀering brands
of the product (ﬁrms), which are parameterized by ζ = (ζ0,ζA,ζB). A consumer with
brand preferences ζ has net utility vi + ζi if he buys from ﬁrm i, and net utility ζ0 if
no contract is signed, where vi = Eθ[U( )]. The brand preferences ζ = (ζ0,ζA,ζB) are
independently and identically distributed according to a known distribution among the
two groups of consumers.
To solve for the tariﬀs that are oﬀered in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by the
two ﬁrms, we follow the approach of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and model ﬁrms as
oﬀering utility directly to consumers. Each two-part tariﬀ can be considered as a deal of
a certain expected value that is oﬀered by a ﬁrm to its consumers. Thus, ﬁrms compete
over customers by trying to oﬀer them better deals, i.e., a two-part tariﬀ that yields
higher utility (including loss utility). Put diﬀerently, we decompose a ﬁrm’s problem into
two parts. First, we solve for the two-part tariﬀ that maximizes proﬁts subject to the
constraint that the consumer receives a certain utility level. Thereafter, we solve for the
utility levels (vi
1,vi
2) a ﬁrm i oﬀers to its customers. It is important to note that when λ is
unobservable, the two-part tariﬀs have to be designed such that each group of consumers
prefers the oﬀer that is intended for them. Suppose that the utility oﬀered to consumers
of group j by ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B is vA
j and vB
j , respectively. Furthermore, assume that the
incentive constraints are satisﬁed. Then, the market share of ﬁrm A in the sub market j is
mj(vA
j ,vB
j ) and the market share of ﬁrm B is mj(vB
j ,vA





1. The market share function mj( ) is increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing in
the second. Since the brand preferences are identically distributed among the two groups,
the market share functions are identical for the two sub markets, i.e., m1( ) = m2( ) =
m( ). Following Armstrong and Vickers, we impose some regularity conditions in order to
guarantee existence of equilibrium. First, we assume that
∂vAm(vA,vB)
m(vA,vB)
is non-decreasing in vB.
Second, we assume that for each sub market the collusive utility level ˜ vj exists which
maximizes (symmetric) joint proﬁts.37
B.2. Firm’s Subproblem: Joint Surplus Maximization
For this part, suppose ﬁrms can observe consumers’ types λ ∈ {λ1,λ2}. With consumers’
loss aversion types being observable, the two market segments of types λ1 and λ2 can
37For a detailed description of the competition-in-utility-space framework and the needed assumptions
see Armstrong and Vickers (2001). A similar approach is used by Rochet and Stole (2002).
42be viewed as distinct markets. Thus, for the analysis we can focus on one market where
consumers are homogeneous with respect to their degree of loss aversion, which is denoted
by λ.
Suppose ﬁrm i ∈ {A,B} oﬀers consumers a “deal” using a two-part tariﬀ (Li,pi)
that gives them utility vi. Then, if a consumer with brand preferences ζ = (ζ0,ζA,ζB)
purchases from ﬁrm i his net utility is vi + ζi. Let πj(vi) be ﬁrm i’s maximum proﬁt per
customer of type j when oﬀering them a deal that yields utility vi. The per-consumer
proﬁt function is the same for both ﬁrms, but in general it depends on the consumer’s
degree of loss aversion λ. For now we focus on one market segment and therefore the
subscript indicating the loss-aversion type can be omitted without confusion. Since π( )
is the same for both ﬁrms, we will omit ﬁrm’s superscript in the following. With this





L + (p − c)
  ¯ θ
θ
ˆ q(θ,p)f(θ)dθ
        Eθ[U(ˆ q(θ,p)|θ, q(φ,p) )] = v
 
. (B.1)
First, we study the ﬁrm’s subproblem, that is, we derive the optimal two-part tariﬀ that
solves the above problem. Thereafter, we solve for the utility levels and the corresponding
tariﬀs which are oﬀered by the two ﬁrms in equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, the task is to
maximize a ﬁrm’s proﬁt over the choice variables p and L subject to the constraint that
the consumer’s expected utility from the oﬀered deal is v. The ﬁrm’s tariﬀ choice problem
can be restated as a problem of choosing only the unit price p. The ﬁrm chooses p to
maximize S(p) − v, i.e., the ﬁrm chooses the marginal price p such that the joint surplus
of the two contracting parties, the consumer and the ﬁrm, is maximized. The optimal
marginal price ˆ p is independent of the utility level v, that the ﬁrm oﬀers to the consumer.
This immediately implies that π′(v) = −1. More importantly, the optimal marginal price
is characterized by the same conditions as in the case of a monopolistic ﬁrm.
In the following we focus on the proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm A. We assume
that Assumption 2 holds for both types of loss-averse consumers, i.e., for λ ∈ {λ1,λ2}.
Moreover, it is assumed that Σ(λ2) ≥ c.
B.3. Symmetric Information Case
Consider market segment j ∈ {1,2}. For a given utility level vB
j oﬀered by ﬁrm B, the







j ) . (B.2)









j ) = 0 . (B.3)
Remember that π′
j(vA) = −1. The optimal marginal price is unaﬀected by the choice of
vA
j . If ﬁrm A oﬀers one unit utility more to consumers, then this is optimally achieved by
43lowering the ﬁxed fee by one unit. The ﬁxed fee is a one-to-one transfer from the consumer





Applying Proposition 1 of Armstrong and Vickers (2001), the ﬁrm’s per customer proﬁt
in sub market j in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
πj(ˆ vj) = Φ(ˆ vj) ,
where ˆ vj denotes the utility oﬀered to the consumers of type λj by both ﬁrms in equi-
librium. As is shown by Armstrong and Vickers, there are no asymmetric equilibria.
Moreover, the equilibrium often is unique.38 The following proposition summarizes the
tariﬀs oﬀered by the two ﬁrms in equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (Full Information). Suppose that Assumption 2 holds for consumers of
both groups. Then, in equilibrium,
(i) if Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2) both ﬁrms oﬀer the tariﬀ (ˆ p, ˆ L) with a positive unit price to
consumers of type λ1, and a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ (0,LF) to consumers of type λ2.
(ii) if c ≤ Σ(λ1) < Σ(λ2), then both ﬁrms oﬀer the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ (0,LF) to both types
of loss-averse consumers.
The tariﬀs (ˆ p, ˆ L) and (0,LF) are characterized by: S′
1(ˆ p) = 0,
ˆ L = Φ(ˆ v1) − (ˆ p − c)
  ¯ θ
θ
ˆ q1(θ, ˆ p)f(θ)dθ
and LF = Φ(ˆ v2) + c
  ¯ θ
θ
qS(θ)f(θ)dθ ,
respectively, with ˆ p ∈ (0,c].
Proof. In order to apply Proposition 1 of Armstrong and Vickers (2001), the following
three properties have to be satisﬁed: (i) ∂vAm(vA,vB)/m(vA,vB) is non-decreasing in
vB, (ii) there exists ˜ vj > −∞ that maximizes m(v,v)πj(v) for j = 1,2, and (iii) for
j = 1,2 there exists ¯ vj deﬁned by πj(¯ vj) = 0, πj(v) < 0 if v > ¯ vj. Since we explicitly
assumed (i) and (ii) these properties are satisﬁed. To see that (iii) is also satisﬁed note
that ¯ vj = maxp{Sj(p)}. Obviously, πj(¯ vj) = 0 and πj(v) < 0 if v > ¯ vj. Hence, we can
apply Proposition 1 of Armstrong and Vickers. According to this proposition, there are
no asymmetric equilibria and the equilibrium utility level ˆ vj satisﬁes ˆ vj ∈ (˜ vj, ¯ vj). Since
m(vA,vB)πj(vA) is continuously diﬀerentiable, the equilibrium utility level satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization. Thus, πj(ˆ vj) = Φ(ˆ vj).
From Proposition 3 it follows that the optimal marginal price ˆ pj is greater than zero
if and only if Σ(λj) < c. If this is the case, then ˆ pj is characterized by S′
j(ˆ pj) = 0, as was
38See Armstrong and Vickers (2001) for suﬃcient conditions for a unique equilibrium.
44shown in the proof of Proposition 3. The per-customer proﬁt of a ﬁrm is given by
πj = L + (p − c)
  ¯ θ
θ
ˆ qj(θ,p)f(θ)dθ . (B.4)
Since, in equilibrium, πj = Φ(ˆ vj) the equilibrium ﬁxed fee is given by
Lj = Φ(ˆ vj) − (pj − c)
  ¯ θ
θ
ˆ qj(θ,pj)f(θ)dθ . (B.5)
Replacing pj by ˆ p and 0, leads to the ﬁxed fees ˆ L and LF, respectively.
If the degree of loss aversion of the less loss-averse consumers is below the threshold
given by σ(λ) = c, then ﬁrms oﬀer a measured tariﬀ to these consumers. Next to the
measured tariﬀ, ﬁrms oﬀer a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to the more loss-averse consumers. If the
degree of loss aversion of both types is above the threshold, then ﬁrms oﬀer only a single
tariﬀ, which is a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ.
B.4. Asymmetric Information Case
In this subsection, we investigate the tariﬀs oﬀered by the two ﬁrms when facing a screening
problem, i.e., when the degree of loss aversion is private information. We show that the
ﬁrms can screen consumers with respect to their degree of loss aversion without costs, if
Φ′(v) ≥ 0.39 The main challenge is to show that consumers self-select into the right tariﬀ
if the ﬁrms oﬀer a ﬂat rate next to a measured tariﬀ.
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2), so that such a menu would be optimal
in the symmetric information case (see Proposition 7). Furthermore, suppose that the
ﬁrms oﬀer the same tariﬀs as in the symmetric information case. Φ′(v) ≥ 0 implies that
the additional surplus generated for the less loss-averse consumers of group one, is shared
between the two contracting parties. In other words, it implies ˆ v1 > ˆ v2 and that in
equilibrium, the proﬁt that a ﬁrm earns from a consumer of group one who subscribes
to the measured tariﬀ, is greater than the proﬁt from a consumer from group two, who
subscribes to the ﬂat rate.
Remember that the expected utility from a ﬂat rate is independent of the degree of
loss aversion. Therefore, ˆ v1 > ˆ v2 immediately implies that the less loss-averse consumers
of group one do not have an incentive to choose the ﬂat rate. Conversely, we have to show
that the more loss-averse consumers of group one do not have an incentive to deviate to the
measured tariﬀ. Since ˆ v1 > ˆ v2, we cannot simply use Lemma 2 in order to conclude that
such a deviation lowers their utility. By inspecting the proﬁt of a ﬁrm from the measured
tariﬀ, however, we observe that it decreases with demand because the unit price is below
marginal cost. Since demand is decreasing in the degree of loss aversion, the proﬁt from
a (deviating) consumer of group two who subscribes to the measured tariﬀ is higher than
39For instance, this condition is satisﬁed for the standard Hotelling model and for the logit demand
model, see Section B.5 of this appendix.
45the proﬁt from a consumer from group one. Furthermore, Φ′(v) ≥ 0 implies that the latter
proﬁt is greater than the proﬁt from the ﬂat rate. Hence, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is increased by a
deviation of a consumer of group two. On the other hand, the joint surplus is decreased
by the deviation—since c ≤ Σ(λ2), the ﬂat rate maximizes the joint surplus for consumers
of group two. Therefore, the expected utility must decrease if a consumer from group two
deviates.
Proposition 8 (Asymmetric Information). Suppose that Assumption 2 holds for con-
sumers of both groups and that Φ′(v) ≥ 0. Then,
(i) if Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2) both ﬁrms oﬀering tariﬀ (ˆ p, ˆ L) with a positive unit price
to consumers of type λ1, and ﬂat-rate tariﬀ (0,LF) to consumers of type λ2 is an
equilibrium.
(ii) If c ≤ Σ(λ1) < Σ(λ2), then in equilibrium both ﬁrms oﬀer the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ (0,LF)
to both types of loss-averse consumers.
The tariﬀs, (ˆ p, ˆ L) and (0,LF), are characterized in Proposition 7.
Proof. Irrespective of the rival’s tariﬀ oﬀer, if the sorting constraint is satisﬁed it is optimal
for a ﬁrm to choose pj such that Sj(pj) is maximized. Put diﬀerently, the ﬁrm will choose
the method of generating vj that maximizes its (per-customer) proﬁts. Thus, if no type
λ ∈ {λ1,λ2} has an incentive to mimic the other type, it is an equilibrium that the
ﬁrms oﬀer the same tariﬀs as in the full information case. Obviously, in case (ii) where
c ≤ Σ(λ1) < Σ(λ2), both ﬁrms oﬀer a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to consumers. In this case, a ﬂat-rate
tariﬀ maximizes S1(p) as well as S2(p). Moreover, the generated joint surplus is the same
for both types of loss-averse consumers. Since the brand preferences are i.i.d. across the
λ1 and λ2 types, in any equilibrium each ﬁrm oﬀers a single ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to consumers.
In the remaining part of the proof we show that in the case where Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2),
neither type λ1 has an incentive to choose the tariﬀ (0,LF) nor does type λ2 have an
incentive to choose the tariﬀ (ˆ p, ˆ L).
Claim 1. ˆ v1 ≥ ˆ v2.
Proof. Let S∗
j ≡ maxp{Sj(p)}. Note that S1(0) = S2(0) = S∗
2. The ﬁrm’s per customer
proﬁt from type j = 1,2 when oﬀering utility v is
πj(v) = S∗
j − v . (B.6)
Thus, for any v it holds that π1(v) ≥ π2(v), since S∗
1−v ≥ S∗
2−v. The equilibrium utilities
are characterized by πj(ˆ vj) = Φ(ˆ vj). Hence, we obtain the following relations:
Φ(ˆ v1) = π1(ˆ v1) ≥ π2(ˆ v1) (B.7)
π1(ˆ v2) ≥ π2(ˆ v2) = Φ(ˆ v2) . (B.8)
Suppose, in contradiction, ˆ v1 < ˆ v2. This immediately implies that πj(ˆ v1) > πj(ˆ v2). Hence,
Φ(ˆ v1) = π1(ˆ v1) > π1(ˆ v2) ≥ π2(ˆ v2) = Φ(ˆ v2) . (B.9)
46Since Φ′(v) ≥ 0 the above formula holds only if ˆ v1 > ˆ v2, a contradiction.
With ˆ v1 ≥ ˆ v2 and the expected utility from a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ being independent of λ,
one can conclude that a consumer of type λ1 has no incentive to choose the tariﬀ (0,LF)
that is designed for consumers of type λ2. Finally, we show that type λ2 has no incentive
to mimic type λ1. Let vDEV
2 denote the expected utility of a consumer of type λ2 who
accepts the tariﬀ (ˆ p, ˆ L) designed for type λ1.
Claim 2. vDEV
2 < ˆ v2.
Proof. The expected utility of type λ2 from the tariﬀ (ˆ p, ˆ L) equals the generated joint
surplus minus the proﬁts of the ﬁrm he purchases from. Thus,
vDEV
2 = S2(ˆ p) − ˆ L − (ˆ p − c)
  ¯ θ
θ
ˆ q2(θ, ˆ p)f(θ)dθ, (B.10)
where ˆ q2(θ,p) denotes the demand of type λ2 in the personal equilibrium. Inserting the
explicit formula of ˆ L into (B.10) yields
vDEV
2 = S2(ˆ p) − Φ(ˆ v1) − (c − ˆ p)
  ¯ θ
θ
[ˆ q1(θ, ˆ p) − ˆ q2(θ, ˆ p)]f(θ)dθ. (B.11)
Note that ˆ q1(θ, ˆ p) > ˆ q2(θ, ˆ p) for all θ ∈ Θ, since ∂λˆ q < 0 if p > 0. By Proposition 7, c ≥ ˆ p,
and hence
vDEV
2 < S2(ˆ p) − Φ(ˆ v1). (B.12)
The expected utility of a consumer of type λ2 when choosing the tariﬀ that is intended
for him can be expressed as follows,
ˆ v2 = S∗
2 − Φ(ˆ v2). (B.13)
Hence, a deviation is not utility improving if
S∗
2 − Φ(ˆ v2) ≥ S2(ˆ p) − Φ(ˆ v1) (B.14)
⇐⇒ [S∗
2 − S2(ˆ p)] + [Φ(ˆ v1) − Φ(ˆ v2)] ≥ 0 . (B.15)
The above inequality is satisﬁed since Φ′( ) ≥ 0 and ˆ v1 ≥ ˆ v2.
Thus, if the ﬁrms oﬀer the optimal tariﬀs of the full information case, each type of loss-
averse consumer selects the tariﬀ that is designed for him, which completes the proof.
As in the symmetric information case, if λ1 is below and λ2 is above the threshold
given by σ(λ) = c, then ﬁrms oﬀer a measured tariﬀ to the less loss-averse types and a
ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to the more loss-averse consumers. The ﬁxed fee of the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is
higher than the ﬁxed fee of the measured tariﬀ. In this case, we do not make any claims
47about the uniqueness of this equilibrium.40 If the degree of loss aversion of both types
exceeds the threshold, then we obtain a pooling equilibrium: each ﬁrm oﬀers only a single
tariﬀ that is accepted by both types of consumers.
B.5. Examples of Discrete Choice Models
Hotelling Model with Linear Transport Cost.—Suppose consumers’ ideal brands are uni-
formly distributed on the unit interval [0,1]. The brands of the two ﬁrms, A and B, are
located at the two extreme points, brand A at zero and brand B at one. A consumer with
ideal brand x ∈ [0,1] has brand preferences ζ = (0,−tx,−t(1 − x)). The parameter t > 0
is a consumer’s “transport cost” per unit distance between his ideal brand and the brand











The market share function has to be modiﬁed if vA and vB diﬀer by so much that
m( ) / ∈ [0,1] (this never happens in equilibrium). Moreover, the Hotelling model has
the well-known drawback that market shares are kinked. If, however, the transport cost is
suﬃciently low, then one can focus on the case where the market share function is given
by the ﬁrst term of the above expression and thus well behaved. Formally, for t ≤ (2/3)S∗
2




(t + vA − vB). (B.17)










t + vA − vB. (B.19)
It can easily be seen that the above fraction is increasing in vB. Thus, the Hotelling model
satisﬁes all imposed assumptions if the transport cost is suﬃciently low. One can check
that the collusive utility level exists. To calculate the collusive utility level one has to use
the market share function given in (B.16).
Logit Demand Model.—An obvious drawback of the Hotelling speciﬁcation is that a ﬁrm
does not compete with the rival and the outside option at the same time. A model
40To analyze all equilibria we cannot apply the competition in utility space framework, since we have to
take the sorting constraints explicitly into account.
41See Lemma 1 of Armstrong and Vickers (2001).
48that accounts for this simultaneous competition on two fronts is the logit demand model.
Here, a consumer’s brand preferences ζi for i = 0,A,B are i.i.d. according to the double
exponential distribution with mean zero and variance µ2π2/6, where π (here) denotes the






where γ is the Euler–Mascheroni constant and µ is a positive constant. With this speciﬁ-
cation, the market share of ﬁrm A is given by (see Anderson et al., 1992)
m(vA,vB) =
exp[vA/µ]
exp[vA/µ] + exp[vB/µ] + 1
. (B.21)
The parameter µ captures the degree of heterogeneity among consumers with respect to
their brand preferences. Put diﬀerently, µ measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
A lower value of µ corresponds to a more competitive market. For µ → ∞ the ﬁrms are
local monopolists. Taking the partial derivative of (B.21) with respect to vA yields
∂vAm(vA,vB) =
exp[vA/µ]{exp[vB/µ] + 1}





µ{exp[vA/µ] + exp[vB/µ] + 1}
exp[vB/µ] + 1
. (B.23)





Taking the derivative of Φ( ) with respect to v yields
Φ′(v) =
exp[v/µ]
(exp[v/µ] + 1)2 > 0. (B.25)











µ{exp[vB/µ] + exp[vB/µ] + 1}2 > 0. (B.26)
The collusive utility level ˜ v maximizes m(v,v)π(v). Note that m(v,v) → 0 for v → −∞
and π(v) ≤ 0 if v ≥ maxp{S(p)}. Thus, the collusive utility exists, since m(v,v)π(v) is
continuously diﬀerentiable.
C. Supplementary Material to Section 7.3: Loss Aversion in Both
Dimensions
Proof of Proposition 6. The monopolist maximizes the expected joint surplus by choos-
ing the unit price p. Given that the consumer plays the personal equilibrium  ˆ q(θ,p) 
49characterized by (16), the joint surplus is given by
S(p) =
  ¯ θ
θ
 

















Taking the derivative of S(p) with respect to p and using the personal equilibrium condition
(16), we obtain
S′(p) = (p − c)
  ¯ θ
θ
∂pˆ q(p,θ)f(θ)dθ − λ




[ˆ q(p,θ) − ˆ q(p,z)]f(z)f(θ)dzdθ (C.2)
The optimal unit price fulﬁlls p∗ ∈ [0,c), since S(p) is decreasing for prices above the
marginal cost. If the consumer is not loss averse, i.e., λ = 0, then p∗ = c. Given that
∂qqqu(q,θ) ≥ 0 and λ ≤ 1, the joint surplus is a strictly concave function for p < c.
Formally,
S′′(p) = −(p − c)




  ¯ θ
θ
1 − λ[2F(θ) − 1]
∂qqu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ)
f(θ)dθ < 0, (C.3)
for p < c. With the joint surplus being strictly concave, a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ is optimal when
S′(p)|p=0 ≤ 0, which is equivalent to
c ≤ λ
  ¯ θ
θ
  θ
θ [qS(θ) − qS(φ)]f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ
  ¯ θ
θ ∂pˆ q(θ,p) f(θ)dθ
≡ Σ(λ). (C.4)
Construction of a Personal Equilibrium Since a higher demand type is associated
with a stronger need for the good, we posit that demand is increasing in the type. For a
given quantity, higher types are worse oﬀ compared to lower types. We posit that this is
still the case in the personal equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, the increase in intrinsic utility
due to a higher consumption of a higher type does not outweigh the direct negative eﬀect
on intrinsic utility of being a higher type. Formally, the second hypothesis with respect to
the personal equilibrium requires that the following inequality is satisﬁed:
∂qu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) × ∂θˆ q(θ,p) + ∂θu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) ≤ 0. (C.5)
Given these hypotheses, the consumer’s utility can be written as












q − ˆ q(z,p)
 
f(z) dz, (C.6)
50where α(q) and β(q) are implicitly deﬁned by42
ˆ q(α(q),p) ≡ q and u(ˆ q(β(q)),β(q)) ≡ u(q,θ),
respectively. Under the hypotheses, α′(q) > 0 and β′(q) < 0. Diﬀerentiating (C.6) with
respect to q yields
U′(q|θ) = ∂qu(q,θ)[1 + λF(β(q))] − p[1 + λF(α(q))]. (C.7)
The utility function is strictly concave and thus the ﬁrst-order condition is necessary and
suﬃcient for optimality. Moreover, in equilibrium it has to hold that α(q) = β(q) = θ.
Hence, the personal equilibrium is characterized by ∂qu(ˆ q(θ,p),θ) = p. Obviously, the
demand function characterized by (16) is increasing in the demand type. The second
hypothesis (C.5)—higher types achieve lower utility levels in equilibrium—is also satisﬁed





(Personal) Equilibrium Selection A ﬁnal comment to the personal equilibrium selec-
tion is in order. There may exist multiple personal equilibria for the case analyzed above.
So far, we constructed only one personal equilibrium. As outlined in the text it is rea-
sonable to assume that higher types demand more. Higher types have a higher marginal
utility which implies that a higher q increases the intrinsic utility in the good dimension
and reduces the loss in the good dimension more for a higher than for a lower type. More-
over, it is reasonable to assume that higher types do not consume that much more such
that they achieve a higher intrinsic utility than lower types. Given a personal equilibrium
has to satisfy these features what would be the ex ante optimal plan—the choice accli-
mating personal equilibrium (CPE)? Using integration by parts, the consumer’s ex ante
expected utility can be written as
EU =
  ¯ θ
θ
 
u(q(θ),θ)[1 + λ(2F(θ) − 1)] − p[1 + λ(2F(θ) − 1)]
 
f(θ) dθ. (C.9)
As it is well-known in the literature, with CPE a decision maker is highly risk averse and
may prefer stochastically dominated options. This behavior can be ruled out by assuming
that loss utility is less important than intrinsic utility, i.e., λ ≤ 1. For λ ≤ 1, the expected
utility is strictly concave in q(θ) for all θ. The ﬁrst-order condition obtained from point
wise maximization is
∂qu(q(θ),θ) = p. (C.10)
Thus, at least for λ ≤ 1 the demand function (16) is the ex ante preferred plan among all
plans where higher types consume more but still achieve a lower intrinsic utility level.
42Strictly speaking, β(q) = β(q,θ)
51D. Comparison to the loss function of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)





˜ ηx, if x ≥ 0,
˜ η˜ λx, if x < 0.
The parameter ˜ η ≥ 0 is the degree of reference dependence and ˜ λ ≥ 1 is the degree of loss
aversion. (˜ λ = 1 means that the consumer is not loss averse.)
With loss utility only in the money dimension and reference-dependent preferences
(˜ η > 0), this formulation has the drawback that at the contracting stage, the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) between money and consumption diﬀers from the MRS at the
consumption stage. To see this, we rewrite ˜ µ as




0, if x ≥ 0,
˜ η(˜ λ − 1)x, if x < 0.
(D.1)
Consider a consumer who is not loss averse (˜ λ = 1) but has reference-dependent preferences
(˜ η > 0). Ex-post, his marginal utility of money is 1+˜ η. Ex ante, however, gains and losses
cancel in expectation because the ﬁrst part of the gain-loss function in (D.1) is linear.
Therefore, ex ante, the marginal utility of money is 1. This time-inconsistency arises
because we restrict reference dependent utility to the money dimension. If preferences
were also reference dependent in the good dimension, utility from consumption would also
be multiplied by 1 + ˜ η ex-post, so that the marginal rate of substitution between money
and the good would remain unchanged and equal to the ex-ante MRS.





0, if x ≥ 0,
λx, if x < 0.
If we set λ = ˜ η(˜ λ − 1), this corresponds to the second part of equation (D.1). This
formulation eliminates reference dependence for consumers that are not loss averse because
the ﬁrst part of equation (D.1) was dropped. The ex ante expected utility of a consumer is
unchanged because it only depends on ˜ η(˜ λ−1) (Compare equation (5) in this paper with
the same equation in an older working paper version, Herweg (2010)). The same argument
applies to the ex ante expected joint surplus. Therefore, the condition for the optimality
of a ﬂat rate remains qualitatively unchanged between the diﬀerent formulations.44
Since we do not want to model time-inconsistency, the new formulation which holds
the MRS constant, is the natural choice. Also, this formulation is closer to the original
43 Since only losses matter, we use −µ instead of µ in the main text. This is ignored here to facilitate
the comparison with the formulation of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
44Quantitatively, the conditions diﬀer since optimal demand at the consumption stage is depressed in
the ˜ η-˜ λ-formulation compared to the λ-formulation, because of the diﬀerent MRS.
52formulation of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) with loss aversion in both dimensions,
because this formulation also has a stable MRS.
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